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FROM RADICAL TO PRACTICAL
(AND BACK AGAIN?):
REPARATIONS, RHETORIC, AND REVOLUTION
KAIMIPONO DAVID WENGER*
The story of reparations advocacy is a story of ideas. The language of
slavery reparations varies widely - it can be radical or practical, framed in
dry legalese or soaring moral sermons. These rhetorical choices are more
than just semantic differences; they illuminate reparations goals, shape the
debate, and ultimately create or close off possibilities for reparations
action.
Framing is especially important because of the unusual position of the
reparations movement, with signs of both danger and promise. Federal
courts recently dismissed two different cases seeking different kinds of
reparations for slavery, effectively bringing to a close the possibility of
achieving reparations through the courts in the near future.1 A lawsuit-
propelled settlement, like those in the tobacco or Holocaust cases, is also
now unlikely. Public support for reparations, particularly among non-
Blacks, 2 remains alarmingly low, with some recent surveys placing white
* Associate Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson Law School. Thanks to Al Brophy, Roy Brooks, Jack
Chin, Karla Momberger, Eric Yamamoto, and participants in workshops at Thomas Jefferson School of
Law, LaVerne Law School, and the Southern California Junior Professors Writing Group for excellent
suggestions, both practical and radical. As always, any errors are mine. Thanks as always to my family
for their cheer and support.
I See ALFRED BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO & CON 97-98 (2006) (discussing recent decisions
dismissing the consolidated lawsuit in In re African American Slave Descendants, and the more limited
suit seeking restitution for harms suffered in the Tulsa race riot); CHARLES P. HENRY, LONG OVERDUE:
THE POLITICS OF RACIAL REPARATIONS 20-26 (2007) (discussing reparations cases).
2 Throughout this Article, I will use the term "Black" rather than "black" or "African-American."
Cf Kimberle W. Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) ("I shall use 'African-American'
and 'Black' interchangeably. When using 'Black,' I shall use an upper-case 'B' to reflect my view that
Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other 'minorities,' constitute a specific cultural group and, as such,
require denotation as a proper noun.").
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support for reparations at a mind-boggling five percent.3 Broad legislative
responses are also unpromising. Rep. John Conyers, Jr. has introduced a
bill to study the effects of slavery in every Congress since 1989, but it has
never come to a vote. 4
On the other hand, discussion of reparations remains at an all-time high,
with new academic conferences and symposia proliferating.5 Even more
curiously, certain specific and targeted proposals, such as local apologies
and information-spreading statutes, are actually succeeding on the
legislative front. For example, California recently passed legislation
requiring that insurance companies disclose their ties to slavery. 6 Similarly,
ordinances passed in Chicago, Detroit, and Los Angeles, and other cities
require that companies doing business with those cities disclose any
connection to slavery.7
How does this mix of success and failure reflect the types of arguments
used in the debate? This Article sets out an intellectual history of
reparations. It examines reparations rhetoric and its role in the movement's
successes and failures. Part I of the Article briefly sets out some of the
principal arguments used by reparations advocates through 2000. Part II
shows that reparations advocacy has been an interplay between two main
types of arguments- radical and practical. Part III discusses post-millennial
reparations advocacy and the rise and fall of reparations lawsuits. Part IV
analyzes the failure of the legal narrative, and discusses its effects on the
reparations movement. Finally, Part V looks at ways to strengthen the
reparations movement by building on the strengths of both practical and
radical approaches.
I. A SHORT HiSTORY OF REPARATIONS ADVOCACY, 1865 To 2000
A review of reparations arguments over the past 150 years reveals some
interesting patterns. Slaves and their descendants have sought
compensation for their enslavement since antebellum times; some early
3 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 4-5 (exploring survey results). Cf Lee A. Harris, "Reparations " as
a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery Reparations, 33 U. MEM. L. REv. 409, n.9 (2003) (discussing
the lack of support for reparations among white Americans).
4 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 50, 191-97 (discussing the history of H.R. 40 and the text of the
proposed bill); see also John Conyers, Reparations: The Legislative Agenda, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
151, 151 (2007) (same).
5 See, e.g., A Dream Deferred: Comparative and Practical Considerations for the Black
Reparations Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURM. AM. L. 447 (2003).
6 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 32, 51, 199 (excerpting the California registry).
7 See id. at 32, 51, 201 (setting forth the text of the Chicago ordinance).
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reparations proposals actually predate the Civil War.8 However, the first
major wave of reparations discussion came immediately after the Civil
War.9 This wave included private attempts by freed slaves to receive
compensation for their services,10 as well as national calls for slavery
compensation, especially in the form of land.1 In particular, Radical
Republican politicians like Thaddeus Stevens and Charles Sumner called
for a massive land redistribution from Southern landowners to freed
slaves.12 These proposals echoed the suggestion of General William T.
Sherman - put into practice for a brief period by the Union army - that
freed slaves should receive "forty acres and a mule" from confiscated
Confederate property, as well as surplus army animals.13
Each of these efforts was ultimately unsuccessful. General Sherman's
field order was cancelled by President Johnson; the Radical Republican
proposals failed in Congress; and restitution was transferred to the
Freedmen's Bureau, which was limited in its authority and ultimately
proved ineffective at achieving land redistribution.14 Attempts to collect
back wages through the Bureau also failed. S Only a few Blacks received
land, and that was through race-neutral avenues like the Southern
Homestead Act of 1866.16
8 See id. at 20 (discussing antebellum proposals for slavery reparations); Adjoa A. Aiyetoro &
Adrienne D. Davis, Historic and Modern Social Movements for Reparations: The National Coalition of
Blacks for Reparations in America (N'COBRA) and its Antecedents, 16 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 687,
693 (2010) (discussing calls for reparations dating as early as 1830).
9 See Rhonda V. Magee, The Master's Tools, From the Bottom Up: Responses to African-American
Reparations Theory in Mainstream and Outsider Remedies Discourse, 79 VA. L. REV. 863, 885-92
(1993) (describing Reconstruction-era proposals for reparations); see also BROPHY, supra note 1, at 20-
23.
10 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 21-22 (giving the text of a remarkable letter from former slave
Jourdoun Anderson to his former master, seeking back wages).
11 Rhonda Magee notes that "most of the earliest reparations proposals involved the redistribution
of land in the South." Magee, supra note 9, at 886.
12 See Magee, supra note 9, at 886-88 (describing proposals of Stevens, Sumner, and others); see
also BROPHY, supra note 1, at 26-27 (explaining Stevens' reasoning behind the proposal).
13 See Magee, supra note 9, at 889-90 (noting General Rufus Saxton's plan, which sold 485,000
acres of land at low rates to about 40,000 former slaves); see also BROPHY, supra note 1, at 25, 183-85
(describing General Sherman's Field Order 15, which decreed that 400,000 acres of confiscated land
along the Georgia coast be set aside for the exclusive use of freed slaves).
14 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 27 (noting that "the overwhelming response" in Congress to
Radical Republican proposals for reparations "was one of opposition"); see also Magee, supra note 9, at
889 (describing the failure of reparations proposals).
15 See Magee, supra note 9, at 890 (illustrating the failed efforts of Colonel Charles Bentzoni in
Arkansas, and a Virginia Assistant Freedmen's Bureau Commissioner's failure to collect back wages
for African-Americans illegally retained in slavery).
16 See ROY BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS 8 (2004) (noting that "blacks received
hundreds of thousands of acres in this way, but fewer black families received homestead land than the
number of black families that would have received 'forty acres and a mule' under Special Field Order
No. 15").
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In 1890, Congressional Republicans introduced a bill to pay small
pensions to former slaves, but it failed to gain much support.17 Some
advocates including Callie House continued pushing for various versions of
pension bills for decades, but were unsuccessful and the movement
eventually died out.18 Incredibly, government officials then prosecuted and
convicted some of these reparations advocates on charges of "instill[ing]
false hope in the hearts of the ex-slaves." 19 Other pre-World War I
proposals included a lawsuit seeking a portion of cotton taxes for former
slaves, as well as letters to the President. 20 All of these early attempts to
receive compensation were unsuccessful, and ended early in the 20 th
century. 21
Fifty years after the Civil War, reparations dialogue shifted radically.
One leading figure in the shift was Marcus Garvey, a Jamaican immigrant
and political firebrand who galvanized Black opinion in the 1920s until he
was finally silenced by J. Edgar Hoover. 22 Garvey untiringly promoted the
idea of repatriation to Africa through his Universal Negro Improvement
Association (UNIA).23 In 1920, the UNIA elected Garvey as Provisional
President of Africa and adopted a Garvey-penned Declaration of Rights of
the Negro Peoples of the World, stating that "we, the duly elected
representatives of the Negro peoples of the world, invoking the aid of the
just and Almighty God, do declare all men, women, and children of our
blood throughout the world free citizens, and do claim them as free citizens
of Africa." 24 The Declaration continued: "We declare that Negroes,
wheresoever they form a community among themselves, should be given
the right to elect their own representatives to represent them in
legislatures[and] courts of law. . .25 [and] we believe in the inherent right of
17 See id. at 8-9 (listing various reasons why the bill failed to gain support).
18 See Aiyetoro & Davis, supra note 8, at 699-705 (giving the history of Callie House); see also
BROOKS, supra note 16, at 9 (noting that proposals for ex-slave pensions never received the support of
mainstream black civil rights organizations like the National Negro Business League or the NAACP).
19 See BROOKS, supra note 16, at 9 (commenting that the government "pursued, prosecuted, and
convicted" these individuals on questionable charges).
20 See id. at 34 (discussing early attempts to receive pension payments or tax refunds from slave-
raised cotton). See generally MARY FRANCES BERRY, MY FACE IS BLACK IS TRUE: CALLIE HOUSE AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR Ex-SLAVE REPARATIONS (2005) (giving the history of the movement for Black
pensions).
21 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 97-98 (discussing early lawsuits dismissed in the 1910s).
22 See id. at 34 (giving background on Marcus Garvey). See generally COLIN GRANT, NEGRO WITH
A HAT: THE RISE AND FALL OF MARCUS GARVEY (2008) (providing the history of Marcus Garvey and
the African repatriation movement).
23 See generally GRANT, supra note 22, at 53-55 (discussing the creation of the UNIA).
24 MARCUS GARVEY, SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARCUS GARVEY 16, 18 (Bob
Blaisdell ed., 2004).
25 Id. at 18.
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the Negro to possess himself of Africa." 26 Later, the Declaration read: "We
hereby demand that the governments of the world recognize our leader [and
give Blacks] complete control of our social institutions . . . . [W]e declare
the League of Nations void."27 Garvey followed this up with a series of
related speeches over the next several years. The ultimate goal was to
"build up Africa as a Negro Empire [for] every Black man, whether he was
born in Africa or the western world." 28 The UNIA sought "immediate
establishment of an African nation" at various dates, including 1922.29
White America was the foe, and "the Ku Klux Klan represent[ed] the spirit,
the feeling, and the attitude of every white man in the United States of
America." 30 Garvey continued his political career until his untimely arrest
and deportation. 31
Through the 1960s and 1970s, the reparations movement abandoned
Garvey's repatriation ideas, but remained tied to Black Power groups. 32 In
1969, activist James Forman made headlines when he demanded large
payments from churches.33 Forman's Black Manifesto reflected radical
proposals for societal reconstruction.34 The Manifesto stated, "[W]e shall
liberate all the people in the United States, and we will be instrumental in
the liberation of colored people the world around." 35 It advocated for
"revolution, which will be an armed confrontation and long years of
sustained guerilla warfare inside this country," and sought "a society where
the total means of production are taken from the rich and placed into the
hands of the state for the welfare of all the people." 36 The Manifesto
contemplated a socialist society led by Blacks only; whites and members of
other races had to "be willing to accept Black leadership." 37 In addition to
26 Id. at 19.
27 Id. at 21-22.
28 Id. at 72.
29 Id. at 73.
30 Id. at 75.
31 Other leaders sought to carry on Garvey's legacy. See Aiyetoro & Davis, supra note 8, at 705-
09 (discussing the work of Queen Mother Audley Moore).
32 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 37 (showing how, in the early 1960s, the modem reparation
movement shifted from its original goal of integration to one of Black Power and autonomy).
33 See id. at 37 (discussing Forman's demands).
34 See id. at 37-38 (discussing some of Forman's radical proposals from the Black Manifesto); see
also Aiyetoro & Davis, supra note 8, at 709-15 (discussing how Forman's demands fit into the history
of reparations advocacy).
35 BLACK MANIFESTO: RELIGION, RACISM & REPARATIONS 116 (Robert S. Lecky & H. Elliott
Wright eds., 1969).
36 Id. at 117.
37 Id. at 118 ("[W]e are dedicated to building a socialist society inside the United States where the
total means of production and distribution are in the hands of the State, and that must be led by black
people, by revolutionary blacks who are concerned about the total humanity of this world.").
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the monetary demand of $500 million, the Manifesto contained a spending
plan calling for cooperative farms, Black publishers and television stations,
and massive educational spending. 38 It also called on Blacks to "seize the
offices, telephones, and printing apparatus" of white churches, as part of a
targeted campaign of "total disruption." 39 Another radical group, the
Republic of New Afrika, demanded that Blacks be given land in five
Southern states, which would then be made into an independent Black
nation.40
Martin Luther King spoke in favor of reparations as well, though less
forcefully than other more radical activists. Dr. King wrote that "[n]o
amount of gold could provide an adequate compensation for the
exploitation and humiliation of the Negro in America .. .. Yet a price can
be placed on unpaid wages." He suggested a "massive" settlement payment
to represent compensation for stolen labor.41 However, as Lee Harris notes,
"while Martin Luther King and several civil rights leaders of the time did
believe in reparations, that issue to them was never central." 42
Law professor Boris Bittker made a very different set of reparations
arguments in his 1973 book The Case for Black Reparations, an important
early attempt to understand reparations in legal terms.43 Bittker carefully
analyzed the potential claims for harms of slavery. He ultimately
concluded that most types of reparations for slavery itself were not
feasible.44 Instead, Bittker suggested a focus on Jim Crow issues, especially
38 Id. at 120-21 (describing the reasons and plans for the money demanded).
39 Id. at 122.
40 See ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS 285-86 (2000) (discussing the Republic of New
Afrika movement); Adam Clanton, The Men Who Would Be King. Forgotten Challenges to U.S.
Sovereignty, 26 UCLA Pac. Basin L.J. 1, 23-27 (setting out the history and legal claims of the Republic
of New Afrika and its members). Years later, activists from the Republic of New Afrika joined with
other activists to create the umbrella advocacy group N'COBRA (the National Coalition of Blacks for
Reparations in America) during the 1980s. See Adjoa A. Aiyetoro, The Development of the Movement
for Reparations for African Descendants, 3 J. L. SOC'Y 133, 142-43 (2002). See also id. at 143
(discussing reparations support among other Black Power organizations such as the Nation of Islam);
Aiyetoro & Davis, supra note 8, at 728-30 (discussing the history of N'COBRA).
41 See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 150-51 (1964); see also Anthony Cook,
King and the Beloved Community: A Communitarian Defense of Black Reparations, 68 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 959, 962 (2000) (discussing Dr. King's view of reparations in the context of social justice);
BROPHY, supra note 1, at 224; David Boyle, Unsavory White Omissions? A Review of Uncivil Wars,
105 W. VA. L. REV. 665, 689 (2003) (arguing that "King may have never mentioned reparations for
slavery as such, but his words show he would likely not have been uncomfortable with the idea").
42 Lee A. Harris, Political Autonomy as a Form of Reparations to African-Americans, 29 S.U. L.
REV. 25, 37 (2001).
43 See BORIS BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973); see also BROPHY, supra note
1, at 38-40 (discussing Bittker's role in the reparations debate.
44 See BITTKER, supra note 43, at 135-37 (noting that reparations claims would compete with
nonracial welfare programs in seeking public money).
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desegregation claims that might be brought under §1983.45 However, his
analysis was not widely accepted, and was criticized by radical scholars
such as Derrick Bell.46 Although he admired Bittker's project, Bell
suggested that reparations proposals were effectively blocked by white self-
interest.47
An important shift in the discussion took place in 1987, in an article by
Mari Matsuda discussing reparations and causation. 48 Matsuda argued that
law systematically undervalues the experience of the oppressed, using
reparations as one illustration of that point.49 She argued that traditional
views on causation help perpetuate existing power structures, and
suggested that reparations could be achieved only if the law bypassed
traditional ideas of proximate causation and individual connection between
wrongdoer and victim in favor of "an expanded version of legal
liberalism," based on "suggesting new connections between victims and
perpetrators."o Matsuda suggested that avoiding problems such as statutes
of limitations and laches required "something other than a rigid conception
of timeliness." 51 Her overall project was a criticism of existing legal theory
and a proposal that law should "look to the bottom" and incorporate ideas
from the oppressed. 52 Her goal was "the transformation of an unjust into a
just world."53 Matsuda's article opened the door to further legal
discussions.
In 1993, two law reviews published articles on reparations. 54 Both
focused on the political aspects of reparations. Rhonda Magee's article
45 See id. at 9-10; see also Magee, supra note 9, at 901-03 (discussing Bittker's analysis).
46 See Derrick Bell, Dissection of a Dream, 9 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV. 156, 162 (1974) (criticizing
Bittker); see also Magee, supra note 9, at 903 (noting that Bittker was "ignored by racial theorists of his
era").
47 See Bell, supra note 46, at 165 (arguing that Bittker's analysis was unlikely to convince white
elites who saw no self-serving interest in Black reparations); see also Magee, supra note 9, at 908-10
(discussing Bell's critique of Bittker).
48 See Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323 (1987). Brophy calls this article "the fountainhead of academic writing on
reparations." BROPHY, supra note 1, at 278.
49 See Matsuda, supra note 48, at 324-41, 374-98 (arguing that the voice or viewpoint of the
oppressed offers a valid normative source to the Critical Legal Studies movement, and that reparations,
as a legal norm deriving from the oppressed, would be attractive to the movement).
50 Id. at 374.
51 Id. at 381.
52 See id. at 340-53, 398-99 (noting that the viewpoint of the oppressed may be a valid source of
legal norms).
53 Id. at 353.
54 See Magee, supra note 9, at 866-67 (discussing the historical legal treatment of reparations for
minority groups); see also Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to
African Americans, 67 TUL. L. REv. 597, 600 (1993) (examining the issues related to reparations to
African Americans).
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adopted an explicitly critical approach. 55 She argued that the colorblind
approach of the political system prevented it from addressing underlying
problems of racial injustice. 56 Additionally, she argued that reparations for
Blacks had been ignored because of white self-interest, driven by inherent
racism in the political system, 57 and that an outsider perspective was
needed to make reparations possible.ss Vincene Verdun's article focused in
particular on the idea of liability for racism, and on an approach of political
strategy rather than legal claims. 59 Finally, in 2000, Randall Robinson's
published The Debt.60 Writing for a general audience, Robinson discussed
the many demographic gaps between Blacks and whites in America, and
tied those gaps to the cultural and psychological legacies of slavery.
Robinson argued that the aggregate unpaid labor that slaves performed
created a debt, payable by America to Blacks.61 Robinson's book was
instrumental in helping to further popularize the topic of reparations. 62
The history of reparations dialogue through the year 2000 shows a
pattern of ebb and flow. It began with relatively simple proposals for
pensions or other modest compensation. By the 1930s, the movement had
become radicalized, with claims for repatriation, large-scale property
transfers, and other broad-based remedies. But during the 1980s and more
so in the 1990s, the movement began to shift again, with legal scholars
discussing specific legal remedies in law journals. This presaged an
important shift that took place around 2000. Before looking at that shift, I
will analyze some patterns and ideas from prior reparations dialogue.
55 See Magee, supra note 9, at 867 (stating that the article would examine the question from a
consciously critical minority perspective).
56 See id. at 898-900 (positing that the colorblind approach justifies the conditions under which
African Americans live as the consequence of their "individual incompetence or indolence" as opposed
to racial oppression).
57 See id. at 908-11 (discussing how white control in the political arena will inevitably lead to
continued racial subordination because whites have a continuing self-interest, whether they realize it or
not).
58 See id. at 911-12 (suggesting that those who have experienced the "falsity of liberal promise"
can provide a inspirational vision and thus assist critical scholars in reaching their goals of remedial
action).
59 See Verdun, supra note 54, at 636-39 (arguing that with regard to slavery, society as a whole
should be held liable because the list of wrongdoers covers such a vast spectrum).
60 RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT (2000).
61 See id. at 107 (demanding that white society acknowledge its debt to slavery's contemporary
victims and pay massive restitution).
62 See, e.g., BROPHY, supra note 1, at 69-71 (noting the effects of Robinson's book on discussion
about reparations).
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II. PRACTICAL AND RADICAL APPROACHES TO REPARATIONS
In reviewing reparations history, it is clear that advocates have taken
some very different approaches to the idea, framing their reparations goals
quite differently at various points in time. Some reparations advocates
promoted a very practical approach to reparations, seeking compensation
within the existing system. Other advocates had much more radical goals
of societal reconstruction. These two basic approaches characterize a
century and a half of reparations rhetoric; each approach has been dominant
at times, and less dominant at other times. That is, reparations discourse
over the past 150 years has been interplay between the two basic
philosophical approaches of Radical Reparations and Practical
Reparations.63
These are broad labels that cover a multitude of related arguments.
Nevertheless, they have some distinct defining features. On a basic
definitional level, arguments which are antagonistic to or critical of the
existing legal system, which are generally unwilling to operate within the
existing legal or political systems, and which seek to bring about major
systemic social changes, are those which I call radical reparations
arguments. As Brophy notes, some advocates "seek a whole new system
that radically redistributes property and therefore economic and political
power."64 For some radical activists, restitution itself may be a peripheral
goal, or primarily a lens through which to make their larger critique. 65 For
instance, Brophy notes that the late reparationist Manning Marable "is
seeking to reform the entire society. .. . For him, reparations talk is a
vehicle for advocating those changes." 66 In contrast, proposals focused on
working within existing legal systems, judicial, legislative, or both, to
obtain concrete gains, such as specific compensation for victims, are those
which I will call practical reparations arguments. 67 The basic dichotomies
63 These terms have not been used in this sense in the legal literature. Some commentators have
labeled portions of the discussion as "radical" in a more general sense. See, e.g., id. at 34, 71, 149. Here,
Brophy refers to advocates who think in grand terms and propose novel and extreme solutions.
However, there has not been the systemic categorization into the radical and practical strands.
6 Id. at 103.
65 Cf Aiyetoro & Davis, supra note 8, at 692 (noting that reparations can be "a lens into the Black
struggle for liberation from slavery and its vestiges").
66 Id. at 236 n.63.
67 Cf Aiyetoro & Davis, supra note 8, at 690 (noting that some reparations advocates have turned
to legal proposals, while others reject courts as illegitimate).
Let me make clear that, in using these labels, I am not intending to imply any criticism of either branch.
In particular, this is not intended to criticize radical reparations with any implication of impracticability.
Radical reparations proposals can be practical in a general sense, as we will see. However, practicality
is not their primary focus. Radical reparations proposals make a broad critique of society. On the flip
side, practicality is a primary concern of practical reparations. Thus, these labels are meant to be
2011] 7 5
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that distinguish the two types of arguments can be shown in a simple table:
Radical Reparations Practical Reparations
arguments arguments
Relationship to Antagonistic; seeks to Co-operative; seeks to
existing legal change or undermine work within existing
and political those structures rather power structures to achieve
structures than working within results.
them.
Ultimate goals Major changes, such as Specific gains (such as
restructuring of society. monetary compensation)
within the existing system.
Of course, there is often a good deal of overlap between these categories.
They are not a strict dichotomy. Rather, they are opposite poles on a
spectrum, and many points lie on the continuum between the two poles. A
reparations advocate may make practical arguments at some points in time
and radical arguments at other points. Proposals may include a mix of the
two. But ultimately, it is often possible to classify arguments as falling
primarily into one of the two categories.
Practical arguments tend to stress the possibility of compromise. The
practical approach focuses on finding a way to make reparations palatable
to majorities. Practical reparationists recognize the difficulty in presenting
these arguments to unsympathetic majorities who will be naturally
skeptical because of factors like interest convergence. 68 Practical
reparations arguments are thus focused on compromise and attainability.
On the other hand, radical approaches to reparations focus on
illuminating underlying structures of subordination. Compromise is not the
goal, and in fact, the need to compromise in order to achieve any success
may be further evidence of the subordination which advocates seek to
illuminate.
Both strands of reparations discourse serve valuable purposes. Radical
proposals keep the spotlight on issues of broad societal injustice, while
practical proposals preserve hope for ultimate compensation. The two
strands work best when they reinforce each other.69
descriptive and to highlight the main focus of each branch, not to imply any value judgment about the
worth of one branch or another.
68 See infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text (discussing interest convergence).
69 Cf Matsuda, supra note 48, at 352-53 (explaining how liberal and critical branches can reinforce
and support each other).
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A. Relation to Other Theoretical Distinctions
This radical/practical divide can be compared with some other categories
for classifying approaches to reparations. There is some overlap in many
existing frameworks, but none fully mirror the practical/radical divide.
For instance, the practical/radical divide is not the same as the difference
between a political and a moral approach to reparations, a distinction which
some scholars have suggested in other contexts. 70 It is true that practical
approaches often focus on the political necessity of compromise. However,
radical approaches can be advanced as political arguments, as activist
James Forman demonstrates, 71 while practical reparations may draw
support from moral arguments, as is shown in the work of Roy Brooks.72
Thus, the practical/radical divide is not simply a restatement of the
political/moral divide.
Nor is the practical/radical divide simply a restatement of the forward
versus backward-looking distinction. Neither practical nor radical
approaches need be intrinsically forward or backward-looking. Some
instances of practical reparations focus on lawsuits, and thus are backward-
looking, 73 while some well-known instances of radical reparations have
been forward-looking. 74 However, it is also possible to make backward-
looking radical arguments, as well as forward-looking practical arguments.
The practical/radical divide is related to, but not the same as, the
difference between corrective and distributive justice.75 Reparations
arguments have used distributive or corrective ideas at different times. 76
Distributive justice, with its emphasis on wealth redistribution to the less
fortunate, is clearly more radical in scope.77 Thus, distributive justice
70 See Roy Brooks, Toward a Post-Atonement America: The Supreme Court's Atonement for
Slavery and Jim Crow, 57 U. KAN. L. REv. 739, 740 (2009) (exploring political and moral approaches);
cf BROPHY, supra note 1, at 73-74 (discussing Brooks' approach as moral rather than political).
71 See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (discussing James Forman).
72 See infra notes 260-265 and accompanying text (exploring Brooks' approach).
73 See infra Part Il (discussing reparations lawsuits).
74 BROPHY, supra note 1, at 26. Some early land redistribution proposals were explicitly forward-
looking in nature, intended to advance the future economic position of Blacks.
75 See id. at 74 (noting corrective and distributive justice goals of reparations). See generally
Katrina Miriam Wyman, Is There a Moral Justification for Redressing Historical Injustices?, 61 VAND.
L. REv. 127, 179-92 (analyzing corrective and distributive justice rationales).
76 See Keith N. Hylton, A Framework for Reparations Claims, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 31, 32
(2004) (noting "two distinct and in some ways conflicting policies behind reparations litigation[;] one
approach is driven in large part by social welfare and distributional goals [while] the other is based on a
desire to correct historical injustices).
77 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 33 ("At the heart of the FleetBoston [reparations] suit is a belief
that reparations litigation will compensate or correct for years and years of inattention, or insufficient
attention, to the welfare of African Americans."); see also Calvin Massey, Some Thoughts on the Law
and Politics of Reparations for Slavery, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 157, 158-67 (2004) (discussing the
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proposals will probably, though perhaps not always, be radical in nature.
These ideas do not fit well within the tort system, which is mainly a
corrective justice system; instead, such remedies must be legislated.78 In
contrast, a corrective justice approach - such as a tort lawsuit for harms
suffered by Blacks-seems more practical. 79 On the other hand, however,
Forman's radical proposals were partly framed in corrective language.
The practical versus radical distinction is related to, but not identical to,
the divide between critical and liberal approaches to law.8 0 Critical
approaches tend to be radical in nature, while liberal approaches to civil
rights are often, but not always, more practical. Liberal approaches to law
often show confidence in the legitimacy of existing laws, while critical
approaches distrust the system and see ingrained racism and other
structural problems. 81 While there are definite similarities between the
frameworks, the practical and radical labels capture something different
about the reparations discussion that is not entirely reflected in the critical
and liberal labels. The practical and radical labels relate to rhetoric and
argument framing, not the writer's overall theory of law. For instance, one
could have a critical approach to law in general, and make reparations
arguments in the context of a critical analysis of law and of racial justice
issues generally, but nonetheless make a practical reparations argument for
strategic reasons, such as pursuing a more realistic payment options. 82
Similarly, the practical/radical divide does not perfectly map onto the
divide between various views on Black politics including nationalist,
integrationist, and separationist. 83 There are likely to be some correlations;
for instance, nationalist ideas are almost certainly radical in nature.
However, radical reparations proposals need not be nationalist in nature;
two different approaches).
78 See David Lyons, Corrective Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery and Jim
Crow, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1375, 1375-78 (2004) (calling for legislative policies to rectify racial inequities);
see also Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative
Action and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REv. 683, 707-08 (2004) (arguing for corrective justice as practiced
by all of society through a collective approach). Cf Richard Epstein, The Case Against Black
Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1186 (2004) (noting that a legislative initiative doesn't require
corrective justice, but simply enough votes to pass).
79 See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 78, at 685, 707 (noting the history of corrective justice within
American criminal and tort law); see also Lyons, supra note 78 (discussing the practicality of a tort
action).
8) See Matsuda, supra note 48, at 341 (discussing the different approaches, and the benefits of
each).
81 See generally Kaimipono David Wenger, Reparations Within the Rule of Law, 29 T. JEFFERSON
L. REV 231 (2007).
82 Several scholars whose views are critical on the whole have nonetheless adopted pragmatic
practical reparations arguments.
83 See Magee, supra note 9, at 868 (comparing nationalist versus integrationist approaches to civil
rights).
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they can be integrationist in tone, while still seeking broader changes in
society.84
Thus, the radical versus practical divide is a new way to approach and
frame reparations discourse. This approach classifies reparations
arguments based on their stated goals and advocacy methods. In doing so,
it can allow us to better understand the history of reparations dialogue.
This is not to suggest that the radical-practical divide is the most important
divide in this area, or that it supplants other frameworks. This distinction is
most useful in conjunction with other frameworks. This framework offers
insight into important trends in the discussion. As Aiyetoro and Davis
write in their own analysis of reparations as a social movement,
"reparations claims are meaningful not only for what they tell us about the
law and legal institutions, which thus far have largely denied redress, but
also for what these suits and other non-legal activism reveal about the
people who bring them and the social movements in which they
participate." 85
The extent to which reparations discussions over the past century fit into
one of these two categories - and correspondingly, the extent to which the
discourse has tended to be dominated by one school or the other - is quite
striking.
B. Practical and Radical Reparations From 1865 to 2000
With the practical/radical framework now set out, we can focus on how
each approach has been dominant at times. The earliest proposals for
pensions or land, within the first few decades after slavery, blur the lines
the most. They tended to be both radical and practical. They were
practical in the sense that they sought concrete payments or restitution, and
worked within the legal system. However, they were radical because, at
the time, even those limited steps were a major societal upheaval. In
addition, these proposals were sometimes justified with radical rhetoric.86
Fifty years after the Civil War, reparations dialogue entered a lengthy
period of domination by more radical ideas. For instance, Marcus Garvey's
proposals for repatriation were quite radical. His criticism of America and
suggestions for universal African citizenship also showed a deep discontent
84 See generally Roy L. Brooks, Racial Justice in the Age of Obama 77-88 (2009) (discussing
limited separation and integration approaches).
85 Aiyetoro & Davis, supra note 8, at 689-90.
86 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 27. Sen. Stevens argued that land redistribution was necessary
because "the whole fabric of southern society must be changed."
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with existing power structures. 87 This was an entirely understandable
approach. Early Reconstruction hopes for racial equality had been dashed
by the Compromise of 1877 and the rise of Jim Crow.88 Garvey's
radicalism showed Black frustration with the unfulfilled promises of the
Reconstruction Era.
Reparations discourse during the Black Power era remained radical in its
goals. Advocates like James Forman were seeking wholesale societal
change. Radical reparations advocacy was about much more than seeking
money. The purpose of radical reparations advocacy was again to
challenge the legitimacy of the system. Radical writers tended to focus on
reparations as an illustration of the inherent injustices in the legal system,
or as an abstract goal. These advocates were short on concrete proposals
that might work in the existing society, and long on proposals for wholesale
overhaul of law, society, or both. Radical ideas dominated the era. One
byproduct of this radicalization was widespread public skepticism towards
reparations. As Elazar Barkan notes, reparations proposals during this time
were "rarely, if ever, taken seriously in public debates" and instead lived in
a sort of "political fantasy land." 89
Boris Bittker's book The Case for Black Reparations is the exception
which illustrates the rule. Bittker's analysis was an extremely practical
legal discussion, and explicitly framed as such. Bittker argued that "far
from being a bizarre, outrageous, and unprecedented proposal," reparations
were "susceptible to ordinary legal analysis." 90 However Bittker was
criticized precisely because of his attempt to distance reparations from their
radical roots. Derrick Bell stated, "Perhaps only lay advocates of Black
reparations will recognize the value of the 'bizarre' and 'outrageous'
character of James Forman's Manifesto for attracting attention and
provoking controversy that can have positive as well as negative effects." 91
The dialogue shifted during the 1980s, as legal writers began to examine
and flesh out the legal case for reparations. Mari Matsuda's 1987 article
rekindled interest in legal analysis of reparations. Discussions remained
relatively radical in their scope - as Matsuda notes, her proposal did not fit
well within the existing legal system.92 While Matsuda's article was radical
87 See Adjoa Aiyetoro, Formulating Reparations Litigation Through the Eyes of the Movement, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 457, 462 (2003) (noting that Garvey "spoke to getting away from a
government that had oppressed so brutally").
88 See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REvOLUTION (2002).
89 BARKAN, supra note 40, at 286, 289.
90 BITTKER, supra note 43, at 68.
91 Bell, supra note 46 at 162.
92 See Matsuda, supra note 48, at 388-99.
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in approach, it was nonetheless published in a law journal. This was a
change from prior eras when very few serious discussions of reparations
had appeared in law journals. This lacuna shows two things: first, that
radical reparationists were not using the medium of legal journals, and
second, that those journals did not consider reparations for slavery to be a
serious legal topic. 93 Rather, both groups seemed to view reparations as a
topic for other forums; it was not related to the law.94
The subsequent law review articles by Magee and Verdun served as a
bridge from radical reparations discussions to more practical legal
discourse. While each argument was radical with respect to its scope and
conclusions, they also introduced some more practical analysis. This is not
surprising; Matsuda believed that the critical/liberal divide was overstated,
and that the two views could in fact support each other.95 Like Matsuda,
both Verdun and Magee make some concessions to practical, rather than
radical, approaches to reparations.96 While each ultimately approached the
issue from the radical side, the stage was set for a broad-scale shift towards
practical reparations. These articles remained radical in their general
approaches though; for instance, neither article argued for reparations
within the existing legal framework. However, while essentially radical in
tone, Magee's article reflects some aspects of a practical reparations
argument; Verdun's article similarly straddles the divide.
III. POST MILLENNIAL REPARATIONS RHETORIC: THE RISE AND FALL OF
REPARATIONS LAWSUITS
A. Practical Reparations and the Rise ofReparations Lawsuits.
Around the year 2000, a new kind of reparations discourse emerged as
legal academics examined reparations using tort doctrines. These scholars,
including Al Brophy, Charles Ogletree, and Robert Westley, developed a
legal reparations narrative focused on bringing tort or tort-like claims
private companies that profited from slavery.97 The first example of this
93 See Magee, supra note 9, at 900-01 (stating that legal scholars have paid little attention to
reparations).
94 These discussions were certainly taking place in other venues, though, as illustrated by
reparations discussion during the 1960s in the New York Review of Books. See Walter Olson,
Reparations RIP., CITY JOURNAL, Autumn 2008, at 89.
95 See Matsuda, supra note 48, at 352-53 (laying out several considerations upon which a united
front could be built between radical and practical critics).
96 See Magee, supra note 9, at 913 (focusing instead on the division between "mainstream" and
"outsider" approaches to reparations).
97 The earlier high-profile Cato lawsuit, not framed as a tort action against private parties, had been
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approach was Robert Westley's 1998 law review article Many Billions
Gone.98 Westley argued that it was time to "reconsider and revitalize the
discussion of reparations" using tort concepts to address the harms of
slavery. 99 His article drew on both the radical and practical traditions;
while Westley couched his proposal in radical language, he also made
distinct moves towards a practical, lawsuit-driven approach. In particular,
Westley suggested "mapping a legal path to enforcement of Black
reparations,"oo and his article focused on particular legal remedies as
attainable goals in a way that had not previously been attempted. 101
Westley's work paved the way for a variety of articles focusing on
specific legal strategies.102  Legal articles were often the work of
established scholars in other fields who had not previously written about
reparations. For instance, scholars including Anthony Sebok, Eric Miller,
and the participants in a 2002 symposium at New York University
examined discrete legal questions relating to unjust enrichment and the
statute of limitations. 103 Indeed, the topic was a new focus for legal
scholarship, as reparations had not previously been discussed at any length
in legal academia. These articles tended to take a practical approach,
although a significant minority of them included more radical elements,104
dismissed a few years earlier. See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
98 See Robert Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is it Time to Reconsider the Case for Black
Reparations?, 40 B.C. L. REV. 429, 432 (1998). Lawsuits had been suggested before. As hoted above,
Boris Bittker's 1973 book was an important early argument for reparations. However, the idea did not
develop more substantially until Westley's analysis.
99 Id. at 432.
100 Id. at 433.
101 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 67-69 (discussing the impact of Westley's article as "[t]he single
most important article in modem reparations theory" which "marked a key turning point in the
reparations debate").
102 See id at 97-140 (exploring the development of legal arguments about reparations).
103 See Symposium, A Dream Deferred: Comparative and Practical Considerations for the Black
Reparations Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 447 (2002) (containing articles discussing the
relationships between reparations and various legal concepts); Eric J. Miller, Reconceiving Reparations:
Multiple Strategies in the Reparations Debate, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 45, 52 (2004) (arguing that
unjust enrichment theory may encourage hostile attitudes on either side of the reparations debate);
Anthony J. Sebok, Two Concepts of Injustice in Reparations for Slavery, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1405, 1416,
1419 (2004) (discussing reparations lawsuits brought under the theory of unjust enrichment and some of
the obstacles these lawsuits faced, such as statutes of limitations bars).
104 Some practical articles include Miller, supra note 103; Keith Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law, 84
B. U. L. REv. 1209 (2004); Kaimipono David Wenger, Slavery as a Takings Clause Violation, 53 AM.
U. L. REv. 191 (2003) (framing the reparations argument as a legal claim for a Takings Clause
violation); Wenger, supra note 81; and Sebok, supra note 99. Radical articles include Lee Harris,
Political Autonomy as a Form of Reparations to African-Americans, 29 S.U. L. REV. 25 (2001); Joe
Feagin, Documenting the Costs of Slavery, Segregation, and Contemporary Racism: Why Reparations
Are in Order for African Americans, 20 HARV. BLACKLETIER L.J. 49 (2004); and Aiyetoro, supra note
83. A few articles bridge the divide or incorporate both arguments. See, e.g. Westley, supra note 98;
Charles J. Ogletree, Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 38 (2003).
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by generally focusing on framing reparations questions in legal terms and
discussing the possibility of legal remedies.
Alfred Brophy's 2006 book, Reparations Pro & Con, represents the
crystallization of, as well as the best primer for, the legal reparations
narrative. Brophy sets out in detail the legal issues these lawsuits present,
the types of claims brought, the types of defendants, plaintiffs, and
damages, as well as the difference between tort and unjust enrichment
claims.105 He discusses the questions of causation that arise in the
reparations context, 106 specific defenses like the statute of limitations,107
and specific rulings from courts in reparations litigation cases.108
The ultimate practical and lawsuit-based arguments about reparations in
this era were made in lawsuits themselves. In 2002, Deadria Farmer-
Paellman filed suit in federal court, seeking reparations from a variety of
corporate defendants under tort and unjust enrichment theories.109 In 2003,
advocates filed suit in Alexander v. Oklahoma, seeking compensation for
victims of the Tulsa riot.' 10
B. The Raison d'etre ofReparations Lawsuits
a. Potential Benefits of Reparations Lawsuits
Lawsuits played a specific role in reparations strategy, and offered
important benefits."Il The major strategic benefit was potential recovery.
Lawsuits offered a real chance at compensation, and the potential
settlement for claims of harm against Black Americans was enormous -
enough, advocates hoped, to invigorate and transform the Black
community.112
Legal scholars offered a good hook for believing that recovery was
possible. The theory of group compensation changed significantly between
105 See id. at 97-117 (discussing specific aspects of reparations litigation).
106 See id. at 100-02 (noting typical causation problems).
107 See id. at 102-03 (commenting on the statute of limitations and how courts have applied it).
108 See id. at 121-33 (discussing how courts have ruled in such cases).
109 Farmer-Paellmann v. FleetBoston Fin. Corp., No. CV-02-1862 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002)
(complaint and jury trial demand), available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/slavery/fllmnflt
032602cmp.pdf See Kaimipono David Wenger, Causation and Attenuation in the Slavery Reparations
Debate, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 279, 297-301 (2004) (discussing claims brought against corporate
defendants).
110 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 128-32 (describing the Alexander lawsuit).
111 See Westley, supra note 98, at 467-76 (discussing the potential benefits of reparations).
112 See ROBINSON, supra note 60, at 235-47 (encouraging the Black community to take power by
seeking remedies for injustice); see also Westley, supra note 98, at 468-70, 474-76 (noting the need to
empower the Black community).
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1987 and 2000. Over about a twenty-year period, several high-profile mass
compensation groups were successful in seeking some form of
compensation. In 1988, Americans of Japanese ancestry were awarded
compensation for internment in relocation camps during World War 11.113
The Japanese-American compensation began in part from litigation, and
while the case itself failed, the increased public consciousness of the
Japanese-Americans' story - along with a congressional report - eventually
led to legislation granting compensation.1 4 Similarly, Holocaust victim
groups brought suit in the 1990s seeking compensation for enslavement,
human rights abuses, and unjust enrichment.11 5 After protracted litigation, a
series of settlements provided various victims with some degree of
restitution.116 Other large group compensation cases played out over the
same time period, including tobacco litigation which eventually resulted in
a massive settlement.117
Discussion of reparations lawsuits explicitly built on these models; for
instance, Robert Westley cited Japanese Americans and Holocaust victims
as potential precedents.11 8 The focus was on practical remedies like mass
restitution in a tort context. In one important article, Brophy set out the
goal for reparations cases, later elaborated in Pro & Con, "focus[ing] on
the moral and legal case for reparations and how proposals made might
actually work."119 Adjoa Aiyetoro wrote that "the next step towards
success is to formulate a cognizable legal claim within the judicial
113 See ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT 390, 401-05 (2001) (giving background on Japanese-American internee
reparations).
114 See id.
115 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 45-46 (discussing claims brought by Holocaust survivors after
World War II); see also Westley, supra note 98, at 453-58 (explaining the steps taken by European
Jews after World War II to reclaim their property). See generally BARKAN, supra note 40, at 88-111
(providing background on the Holocaust restitution claims); Bert Neubome, Holocaust Reparations
Litigation, Lessons for the Slavery Reparations Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L. 615, 621
(2003) (analogizing the problems facing lawsuits brought by Holocaust descendants to those faced by
descendants of slavery).
116 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 45-46 (mentioning the outcome of post-World War II claims
brought by Holocaust survivors and their families).
117 See Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV.
853, 874-75 (1992) (discussing the two waves of tobacco litigation); see also Wenger, supra note 109,
at 306-16 (exploring the analogy between reparations and mass torts, focusing on Agent Orange, DES,
Bendectin, tobacco and asbestos litigation).
118 See Westley, supra note 98, at 449-60 (examining the methods by which Congress granted
reparations to these groups, and suggesting that successful reparations claims depend on the political
climate and fitting tightly within the individual rights paradigm); see also Alfred Brophy, Some
Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497, 500-01
(2002) (discussing reparations precedents including Japanese Americans and Holocaust claimants).
119 Brophy, supra note 118, at 497.
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system."l20
Legal actions provided secondary benefits as well. For instance, they
potentially opened the door for discovery. In some mass restitution cases,
such as the tobacco litigation, that power ultimately ended up being
instrumental in providing information that ultimately led to settlement. 121
In addition, information gleaned from the legal process could be used for
storytelling and consciousness-raising. 122
Reparations lawsuits also offered a vision of recovery framed as a
distinct moral payout. In a legal action, government or private actors
involved in slavery could be characterized as legally culpable
wrongdoers. 123 These lawsuits also offered a corrective framing of the
question where plaintiffs could seek a form of vindication in court, an
official judicial statement that they were harmed. This meant that there
were moral and symbolic advantages to bringing a claim in court. 124
Lawsuits brought a new level of conceptual cohesion to the discussion.
As noted earlier, prior reparations proposals had varied widely, ranging
from pension proposals to Forman's Manifesto and Garvey's repatriation
plans. Advocates have disagreed over many questions relating to remedies
or recipients.125 Legal scholars like Brophy altered the discussion, with the
details of legal claims providing a new unifying principle that limited the
scope of advocacy.
Lawsuits also altered the discussion by providing a clear endpoint. This
gave a concrete goal, the possibility of closure, which could be used to
120 Aiyetoro, supra note 40, at 144. See also id. at 134 ("One of the challenges is to create legally
cognizable claims for reparations.").
121 See Rabin, supra note 113, at 867-68 (discussing how discovery tactics played an important
role in tobacco litigation).
122 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 145 (noting that disclosure leads to consciousness-raising, which
sets the stage for reparations); see also Matsuda, supra note 48, at 359 (defining consciousness-raising).
Specifically, Matsuda notes that:
consciousness-raising in the feminist context is the collective discussion and consideration of the
concrete, felt experience of gender in order to identify commonalities, and build a theory of the
cause, effect, and means of eradication of sexist oppression. Consciousness-raising deliberately
examines the detail of life in a gender-biased society. As method, it differs from the typical top-
down, abstract method of male-dominated jurisprudential inquiry. The method can, however,
respond to the same inquiries: what is law, how does it work, what can it be, what should it be?
Consciousness-raising about race can include self-inquiry into one's attitudes toward race,
dialogue across racial lines, and inquiry into the life experiences of people of color. Id.
123 See generally ROBINSON, supra note 60 (framing reparations as a question of debt).
124 There is an important symbolic value in taking a claim to court. Even if a settlement did not
admit fault, as in some mass restitution cases, the community could still view it as a moral victory,
because refusals to admit legal fault are often viewed as illusory. See Magee, supra note 9, at 900, 905.
125 See, e.g., Charles Ogletree, From Brown to Tulsa: Defining Our Own Future, 47 HOWARD L.J.
499, 578 (2004) (proposing that reparations would "not be divided equally" and would not be given to
wealthy Blacks).
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defuse critics who claimed that reparations claims created a never-ending
process.126
Consequently, over the last decade, within the confines of legal
academia, the concept of reparations lawsuits gained some currency.
Conferences and papers examined topics like the statutes of limitations,127
unjust enrichment,128 mass torts,129 Indian law,130 takings,131 and other
discrete legal issues, and a certain type of dialogue emerged. As the
lawsuits progressed, reparations talkl 32 became increasingly flavored with
legal terminology. At the same time, radical ideas on reparations were no
longer a significant part of the discussion. That is, the emergence of
reparations lawsuits and the accompanying narrative fostered a new tone in
the dialogue. Additionally, it partially replaced the earlier diffused, broad
and radical approach to reparations with a newer focused and narrow legal
vision.
b. Reparations Lawsuits in a Multi-Prong Legal Narrative
Reparations lawsuits were generally intended as part of a strategy
including other components. 133 This multi-pronged approach reflected the
widespread perception that reparations were unlikely to be awarded
outright at trial, but that, nonetheless, legal cases could play an important
role. Many reparations advocates agreed that ultimately, the most fruitful
route would be through legislative action or some sort of settlement.134
126 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 176 (arguing for the strategic need for an endpoint); see also Saul
Levmore, The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations: Privatizing Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1291,
1302 (2004) (commenting on finality concerns); Charles Krauthammer, Reparations for Black
Americans, TIME, Dec. 31, 1990, at 18 (suggesting that reparations would be an acceptable price for
finality).
127 See generally Miller, supra note 103 (focusing on tolling or otherwise avoiding the statute of
limitations).
128 See generally Sebok, supra note 103 (analyzing the unjust enrichment that occurred as the
result of discrimination and the reparations that followed to remedy that treatment).
129 See generally Wenger, supra note 109 (examining the analogy between reparations and mass
torts).
130 See Rebecca Tsosie, Acknowledging the Past to Heal the Future: The Role of Reparations for
Native Nations, in REPARATIONS: INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRIES (Jon Miller & Rahul Kumar eds.,
2007); see also Rebecca Tsosie, Engaging the Spirit of Racial Healing within Critical Race Theory: An
Exercise in Transformative Thought, II MICH. J. RACE & L. 21 (2005) (describing the history and
development of restitution claims in Indian Law).
131 See Wenger, supra note 81, at 257-58 (analyzing the takings argument in the reparations
context).
132 See generally Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery and the Tort Law
Analogy, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 (2004) (describing the development of reparations talk).
133 See Aiyetoro, supra note 40, at 137 (noting that reparations advocacy requires a multi prong
strategy).
134 See Westley, supra note 98, at 436 (arguing that it is Congress, and possibly state legislatures,
that must be persuaded to enact reparations); Brophy, supra note 118, at 535-40 (noting the need for
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This reflected the fact that victories for other groups have typically come
through settlement, not trial.135 Brophy notes in Pro & Con that "lawsuits
look like a very difficult way of obtaining meaningful reparations.
Individual lawsuits are simply not well honed to deal with claims by a
group against descendants of a group of beneficiaries."l 36 He later
concludes that "given the limitations of lawsuits, significant reparations are
likely to come - if at all - through legislation."l 37 This captures the
conventional wisdom: reparations advocates, like most plaintiffs, were
hoping to settle.13 8 That is, lawsuits might not have the direct legal effect of
a judgment in court, but they have indirect legal effects, and direct financial
effects by encouraging settlement, whether private or public.
The ultimate goal of advocates pushing reparations lawsuits was to
create pressure for settlement. This did not require lawsuits to be
successful. For instance, it was a combination of publicity and changed
attitudes, as well as the possibility of legal liability, that ultimately led to
the Holocaust victims settlement.139 Similarly, initial lawsuits seeking
compensation for Japanese-American internees were ineffective, but
lobbying led to federal legislation which created a commission to study and
report on the internment. In turn, that commission authored a highly public
official report in 1983 on the injustices of the detention. The report raised
public consciousness, and eventually Congress acted on the political
pressure by passing legislation granting restitution. 140 Indeed, civil rights
development of dialogue and scholarship to address the possibility of settlement); Miller, supra note
103, at 51-56 (suggesting that settlement is more likely to be successful than litigation).
135 These have included reparations for Holocaust victims and for Americans of Japanese ancestry
imprisoned during World War II. See Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and
Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 694-98 (2003); see also In Re Holocaust Victims
Assets Litigation, 105 F. Supp. 2d 139 (E.D.N.Y. 2000).
136 BROPHY, supra note 1, at 126.
137 Id. at 133; see also Wenger, supra note 109, at 305 ("[u]ltimately, however, reparations cases
may not be best suited for success in court"); Westley, supra note 98, at 435 (noting that "legislatures
provide a friendlier forum than courts").
138 The end goal for most litigants in the modem court system is to reach a settlement. See Peter H.
Schuck, The Role of the Judge in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 337, 337 (1986); see also Mark Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion
and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994); JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL
JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION (1993).
139 See Sebok, supra note 103, at 1407-10 (noting that settlements were reached in part because of
political and social pressures to reach a settlement).
140 See YAMAMOTO, supra note 113, at 390 (discussing how the end result was reached in the
Japanese-American reparations issue). Activists had gained valuable exposure and vindication through
coram nobis suits dismissing unjust prior convictions, but all cases for restitution were dismissed. See
id. at 278-80. A coram nobis suit is one which collaterally attacks a prior conviction based on error of
fact. It is available in limited circumstances. Japanese-American detainees were successful in seeking
coram nobis relief; see also id. at 319-40 (setting out the court's coram nobis opinion, as well as
background).
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history more broadly shows that legal success is not always a necessary
step in changing views or reaching goals.141
Any settlement of this sort would need public support.142 Thus, moral
arguments played an important role, as reparationists sought to "establish a
moral principle that should be embodied in American law and perhaps a
legal model for groups yet to be adequately compensated, such as
Blacks."l 43 Moral arguments would be a foundation for settlement; as
Brophy noted, "[t]he future of the movement undoubtedly will be
determined in large part by our success in making a compelling moral
argument for reparations that gains political support."1 44
The overall strategic approach went along these lines: reparations
lawsuits provided a legal arena to hear claims. They were not expected to
succeed as lawsuits, but along with moral arguments, they would set the
groundwork for settlement by legislative and political actors, as in the case
of Japanese-Americans and Holocaust victims. 145 This new legal narrative
141 See MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2006) (recognizing that there was very little legal change between
Plessy and Brown; rather, the court in Brown responded to changing social and political circumstance);
see also Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative, 41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 113 (1988)
(discussing how government began to support desegregation when this seemed necessary due to
American foreign policy objectives); Mary L. Dudziak, The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs:
Race, Resistance, and the Image of American Democracy, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1641, 1690 (1997)
(stating how decisions about Little Rock were made with a view towards their impact on foreign
relations).
142 See YAMAMOTO, supra note 113, at 479-82; 496-97 (discussing political element in reparations
advocacy); Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts?, 89 GEO. L.J. 2531, 2539 (2001) (noting that any
settlement will require support from white voters); see also Hylton, supra note 76, at 34 ("[P]roponents
of .. . reparations claims believe that significant redistribution towards groups that make up America's
underclass will not be achieved through legislative action. Thus, reparations proponents have turned
towards the courts."); Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical
Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689, 709-11 (2003) (noting "[s]ome reparations programs might be
explained as efforts to remove a moral taint"); Alfred Brophy, Reconsidering Reparations, 81 IND. L.J.
811, 824-25 (2006) (stating that, optimistically speaking, education will force the American conscience
to pay reparations); Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma,
93 HARV. L. REv. 518, 523 (1980) (emphasizing that Blacks are most likely to be politically successful
when they can convince whites that their political interests are aligned).
143 See Miller, supra note 103, at 50 ("Reparations, on this account, involves a demand for
restoration of the ill-gotten gains of slavery to the group that was wronged. In so doing, it suggests both
a legal strategy and an emotionally compelling moral argument. The legal strategy requires us to
identify the various ways that blacks were harmed by whites who profited from slavery, and then to sue
for the repayment of those profits either to individuals or into some central find for more general
disbursement. The moral argument asserts that whites as a group were, and continue to be, responsible
for the ills of the African American community. It is the power and simplicity of that moral claim that
makes reparations at once so compelling an argument and so difficult for the vast majority of whites to
endorse."); cf YAMAMOTO, supra note 113, at 518 ("Those seeking reparations need to draw on the
moral force of their claims (and not frame it legally out of existence) while simultaneously radically
recasting reparations in a way that both materially benefits those harmed and generally furthers some
larger interests of mainstream America.").
144 Brophy, supra note 132, at 86.
145 See, e.g., BROPHY, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing how Conyers' bill is linked to the reparations
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altered the prior reparations dialogue, making it less radical and more
practical in specific ways.
C. Limits of the Legal Narrative
Framing reparations within a legal narrative was promising in some
areas, but it also constrained and limited the dialogue in important ways.
The most important limit of the legal narrative was its scope. The
discussion followed the bounds of the projected lawsuits themselves, which
depended on framing the harms of slavery in the technical legal language
of tort or tort-like claims. Thus, it focused attention on tort remedies;
potentially broader types of remedies were not a central part of the
narrative.146 The narrative also ended up including some other specific
harms, such as those from the Tulsa race riots, which could also fit under
the tort umbrella. This framing conveyed certain messages. Tort law is the
traditional arena for addressing private harms between individuals. 147
Placing reparations claims in the sphere of tort sends a message that these
claims should be perceived as private delicts, rather than harms arising
from state-sponsored oppression.148
Because of its narrow tort focus, this narrative excluded many other
types of claims for harm to Blacks, such as voter suppression,149 violence
and lynching,so cultural theft, 151 peonage and slave-like convict labor
experience of Japanese-American internees).
146 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 23-26 (examining the scope of reparations lawsuits); see also
Hylton, supra note 74, at 36-38 (distinguishing reparations claims from other tort claims).
147 See BROOKS, supra note 16, at 138-40 (discussing the tort approach); Kaimipono David
Wenger, "Too Big to Remedy?" Rethinking Mass Restitution for Slavery and Jim Crow, 44 Loyola
L.A. L. Rev. 177, 205-08 (discussing the limits of tort law in addressing harms to disadvantaged
groups); see generally Jennifer B. Wriggins, Automobile Injuries as Injuries with Remedies: Driving,
Insurance, Torts, and Changing the "Choice Architecture" ofAuto Insurance Pricing, 44 Loyola L.A.
L. Rev. 69, 71-73 (discussing the operation of tort law as a private remedy in the automobile injury
context); Jack B. Weinstein, Compensation for Mass Private Delicts: Evolving Roles of Administrative,
Criminal, and Tort Law, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 947 (discussing tort law as private remedy); Adam
Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV 500 (2011).
148 Cf Magee, supra note 9, at 899 (arguing that the current legal system legitimizes an inferior
status for Blacks and conceals the ways in which that status is the product of oppression).
149 On voter suppression in general, see Gabriel J. Chin & Randy Wagner, The Tyranny of the
Minority Jim Crow and the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty, 43 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 65, 87-94,
122 (2008).
On racialized use of criminal law to suppress voting, see JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN,
LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 64-79 (2006); see also
Gabriel J. Chin, Felon Disenfranchisement and Democracy in the Late Jim Crow Era, 5 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 329, 334-37.
150 See Emma Coleman Jordan, A History Lesson: Reparations for What?, 58 NYU ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 557, 557-59, 566, 612-13 (2004); see also Magee, supra note 9, at 894 (describing the "post-
Reconstruction terrorism" of beatings and lynchings); see also SHERRILYN IFILL, ON THE COURTHOUSE
LAWN (2007).
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practices, 152 educational inequity,153 discrimination,154 and societal racism
in general.155 These omissions meant that this narrative would fail to
address some areas of major racial disparity and harm. For instance,
housing segregation derives from the same underlying racist motives as
slavery, and has had similar deleterious effects on Blacks.156 Nevertheless,
such broad non-tort claims were not included in reparations litigation, and
thus were downplayed in the post-millennial reparations dialogue.
The narrative may have wrongly implied that non-tort-like claims lacked
value. Clearly, slavery is the greatest harm that society has inflicted on
Blacks, and much of slavery fits into the tort framework. Nonetheless, the
harms of slavery are entangled with other effects of racism, such that it is
not clear today that slave descent itself is more harmful to Blacks than
segregation, educational inequity, or other harms caused by racism. 157
Even within the broad tort-based structure there were strategic legal
questions about which instances of tort-like harm to include in reparations
lawsuits.158 Slavery offered the strongest moral claims.159 Yet, it was also
151 See generally K.J. Greene, "Copynorms," Black Cultural Production, and the Debate Over
African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1179, 1183-85 (2008) (describing how
Black cultural property, especially music, was unjustly appropriated).
152 See Aziz Z. Huq, Peonage and Contractual Liberty, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 351 (2001)
(discussing the history of peonage); see also DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME:
THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR 11 (2008)
(setting out the history of forced labor practices akin to slavery).
153 See generally Maurice Dyson, When Government is a Passive Participant in Private
Discrimination: A Critical Look at White Privilege & the Tacit Return to Interposition in PICS v.
Seattle School District, 40 U. TOLEDO L. REV. 145, 148 (2008) (discussing education discrimination
due to unequal funding).
154 Gabriel J. Chin, Jim Crow's Long Goodbye, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 107, 126 (2004). "In large
part because of Jim Crow's gradual rather than abrupt decline, even at the level of formal, written law
there was never a systematic, sustained effort to identify the scope of racial discrimination and
eliminate all of its manifestations." Incredibly, a large number of Jim Crow-era segregation laws remain
on the books in Southern states. Though these laws are not enforced, their continued existence is
troubling. Some attempts to remove them from legal codes have succeeded, but others have not. See
Gabriel J. Chin et al., Still on the Books: Jim Crow and Segregation Laws Fifty Years After Brown v.
Board ofEducation, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 457.
155 See Eric Miller, Presentation at Thomas Jefferson School of Law: Reparations Manifesto
(March 2006); see also BROOKS, supra note 16, at 38-40, 201-04; Feagin, supra note 101, at 57
(discussing negative social and health effects of discrimination); Wenger, supra note 81, at 239
(opining that society is removing Rule of Law protections).
156 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 108 (discussing questions of segregation).
157 See Aiyetoro, supra note 40, at 142 (cataloguing areas where Blacks suffer from subordination,
including criminal law, education law, and others); see also James R. Hackney, Jr., Ideological Conflict,
African-American Reparations, Tort Causation, and the Case for Social Welfare Transformation, 84
B.U. L. REV. 1193, 1197 (2004) (noting that many Blacks who are not slave descendants suffer from
contemporary racism).
158 See, e.g., Westley, supra note 98, at 465-66 (listing the material bases of a claim for
reparations); see also See Hylton, supra note 76, at 43 ("[O]ne should avoid the mistake of viewing
[reparations claims] as monolithic, having the same difficulties in terms of identification of plaintiffs,
causation, and prescription of legal rights. In fact, reparations claims vary along many legal dimensions,
creating a rich array in terms of their consistency with settled law.").
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uniquely subject to some legal defenses, grounded on the passage of time,
the constitutionality of the institution, and other unique vulnerabilities.160
Jim Crow harms did not carry the same moral weight as slavery, but they
also did not suffer the same legal vulnerabilities. Thus, paradoxically, it
was possible to argue concurrently that "the legal argument for reparations
improves with exclusion of the slavery period," and that inclusion of
slavery could be a "tactical loss" as a matter of legal strategy. 161 This was
troubling because slavery is the "emotional component that provides the
moral leverage" for reparations.162
The legal narrative that ultimately developed did not end with slavery,
but also focused on later harms, such as the Tulsa race riot. 163 Tulsa was a
little-known and compelling story which offered some advantages. Less
time had passed, and some of the victims were still living. Tulsa seemed to
present an excellent chance for reparations.164
The broader question remained, however: how to jointly address Jim
Crow and slavery. Although the two shared many features, the legal
differences were significant. Tulsa offered more attractive legal claims for
living claimants; but, the fact that Tulsa differed from slavery in certain
respects made it so that advocates could not effectively package the two
into one lawsuit. 165 Thus, a separate lawsuit would need to focus solely on
Tulsa, but this had a downside, stripping claimants of the compelling moral
and emotional claims stemming from the "super-wrong" of slavery. 166 The
best legal options did not always track the best moral options - and this
was just one area where moral and legal considerations diverged.167
159 See Bell, supra note 46, at 158 (discussing the moral force of slavery claims).
160 See, e.g., Wenger, supra note 81, at 249-51 (examining retroactivity); Wenger, supra note 109,
at 302-06 (discussing unique attenuation problems in slavery reparations); BROPHY, supra note 1, at 75-
76 (analyzing the arguments against reparations).
161 See Bell, supra note 46, at 158.
162 Id.
163 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 50-51, 128-33 (discussing the Tulsa case).
164 See id. at 128, 132 ("Tulsa is a strong case for reparations of some sort, through either the
courts or the legislature. Indeed, four factors suggest Tulsa victims are owed reparations by the
legislature: People are still alive, the incident was concentrated in time and place, government
sponsored the harm, and promises were made to help rebuild.").
165 See id. at 132 ("Tulsa is at once both compelling and limiting.").
166 See Magee, supra note 9, at 901; see also Bell, supra note 46, at 162 (discussing the pragmatic
approach of Jim Crow reparations versus the possibility of morally superior reparations claims based on
the larger moral wrong of slavery, and arguing that advocates should avoid inadvertently de-
emphasizing powerful moral arguments in the name of pragmatism).
167 Reparationists also disagreed on the appropriateness of some legally strong, but morally
limited, doctrines like unjust enrichment. Compare Sebok, supra note 103, at 1440-42, with Hanoch
Dagan, Restitution and Slavery: On Incomplete Commodification, Intergenerational Justice, and Legal
Transmissions, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1139, 1158-63 (2004). Unjust enrichment claims were included in the
lawsuit. See Wenger, supra note 109, at 284-86.
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Another oddity of the legal narrative was its potential colorblindness. Of
course, race is implicit in any discussion of legal harms caused by slavery.
However, the analyses of legal topics, such as statutes of limitations, were
done on a purely legal level. One could imagine a hypothetical problem
not involving race, where such analysis would apply, such as a large mass
tort case. And in fact, reparations scholarship drew extensively from race-
neutral legal precedents.168 Since the lawsuit approach was based on legal
claims, reparations could be merely a legal issue, no longer necessarily tied
to racism or racial justice. Reparations lawsuits could operate independent
of the victims' Blackness. This is troubling because, as critical race
theorists have shown, colorblind legal arguments can perpetuate racial
subordination. 169
This contrasts sharply with the earlier, often radical and racial,
approaches. For instance, Matsuda's 1987 article focused mainly on
making an explicitly critical argument about race, class, and power.
Matsuda used reparations as an illustration to argue that race and class
issues created an existing system that was unjust because it failed to redress
harm to the powerless.170 In contrast, the tort approach focused on specific
legal claims, rather than the underlying racial inequities.
Largely because of its exclusions and limitations, the legal narrative was
unsatisfying for some reparations advocates. 171 While it offered useful
benefits, it was also limited or even impoverished in some important ways:
the narrative was colorblind in nature and bounded by quirky legal rules; it
had narrow scope and uncertain connection to present claims; and it may
have inadvertently de-emphasized some of the stronger arguments in favor
of reparations.
168 This includes my own work. See Wenger, supra note 109.
169 See, e.g., Crenshaw, supra note 2, at 1384. Colorblindness perpetuates the white perspective as
the underlying norm and does not address the problem of underlying hierarchy; and solutions for the
problem of racial injustice must acknowledge the race consciousness that pervades the American
psyche. See id. The color-blind approach is internally inconsistent and is not helpful in protecting
minority rights. Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution Is Color-Blind," 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 30
(1991). This criticism is not universally accepted, and some advocates have championed a colorblind
approach. See Rhonda Magee-Andrews, The Third Reconstruction: An Alternative to Race
Consciousness and Colorblindness in Post-Slavery America, 54 ALA. L. REV. 483, 487-89, 545 (2003)
(advocating colorblind reconstruction based on "universal human dignity" rather than race); see also
Magee, supra note 9, at 898-900.
170 See Matsuda, supra note 48, at 348-53 (noting the inequality in using legal norms that didn't
take into account the viewpoint of the oppressed).
171 See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 150, at 559 (arguing that "an exclusive focus on slavery is
misguided").
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D. The Failure ofReparations Lawsuits
Tort suits were not the first legal failure for reparations. Reparations
claims suffered an earlier blow when the Ninth Circuit dismissed the Cato
v. United States lawsuit against government actors in 1995, partially on
grounds of sovereign immunity. 172 However, Cato predated the shift in
mass restitution that occurred in the late 1990s, when innovative legal
strategies and claims of unjust enrichment resulted in eventual settlements
and reparations for victims of the Holocaust.173
The new lawsuits avoided the problem of sovereign immunity by
targeting long-lived corporate entities. Many observers viewed the Tulsa
suit as even more favorable, because it involved living victims and a recent
government admission of culpability.174 One commenter suggested, "it may
serve as a model of a new - and more legally successful - way to approach
the question of reparations for slavery." 75 Between the Tulsa claims and
the corporate claims, legal success seemed possible.
Alas, that dream was not to be. Corporate claims were consolidated into
the Northern District Court of Illinois, which dismissed the claims in In re
Slave Descendants, holding that they were barred by a variety of legal
hurdles, including standing and statutes of limitations.176 Despite academic
criticism of that decision,177 it remained essentially unchanged, and the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
major claims. 178 Tulsa claims failed as well. The Alexander case seeking
compensation for the Tulsa race riot victims was dismissed as barred under
the statute of limitations, a holding affirmed on appeal.179 While some
172 See Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1111 (9th Cir. 1995); see also BROPHY, supra note 1,
at 121-22.
173 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 45-46 (mentioning the Swiss bank Holocaust lawsuits of the mid-
1990s); see also Sebok, supra note 103, at 1415 (discussing the Holocaust litigation).
174 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 128-32. See generally Alfred L. Brophy, Reconstructing the
Dreamland: The Tulsa Riot of 1921 (2002) (giving background of Tulsa riots).
175 Anthony Sebok, "How a New and Potentially Successful Lawsuit Relating to a 1921 Race Riot
in Tulsa May Change the Debate Over Reparations for African-Americans," FINDLAW, March 10,
2003, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/200303 I 0.html . See DeWayne Wickham, Tulsa
Case is Key Reparations Test, USA TODAY, March 25, 2003; see also BROPHY, supra note 1, at 128
("Tulsa presented one of the best cases for a lawsuit for reparations for Jim Crow, precisely because it
fits into a framework that the law is able to recognize."); Miller, supra note 103, at 52.
176 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 124 (listing the various reasons why the claims were barred); see
also Wenger, supra note 109 (mentioning some of the reasons why claims may be barred in a mass tort
context).
177 See Wenger, supra note 109, at 316-26; see generally Hackney, supra note 158.
178 See In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 471 F.3d 754, 763 (7th Cir. 2006).
One peripheral claim relating to fraud was not dismissed. See Farmer-Paellman v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 552 U.S. 941 (Oct. 1, 2007) (denying certiorari).
179 Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004); see BROPHY, supra note 1, at 131-32
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important gains were made in the litigation, the compensation claims were
dismissed entirely.
E. Reasons the Lawsuits Failed
The new generation of reparations lawsuits 80 failed for a variety of
reasons, including specific legal concerns and larger structural problems.
First, the courts viewed the causation questions raised by reparations cases
as too complex to allow for legal liability. Indeed, reparations lawsuits
created uniquely complex causation issues. As I have written previously,
the reparations cases involved victim attenuation (the link between
deceased slaves and present claimants), wrongdoer attenuation (the link
between slaveholders and current defendants), and act attenuation (the link
between harmful acts of slavery and any present injury). The presence of
all three kinds of attenuation creates a particularly high hurdle; no case
involving such complex attenuation questions has ever succeeded, whether
at trial or settlement.181 Reparationists have long been aware of these
concerns. 182
The problem was exacerbated by the specific composition of the plaintiff
class in the Slave Descendants case. Plaintiffs were unable to show that
they suffered harm traceable to the named defendants. 8 3 The District court
relied chiefly on this lack of connection in dismissing the lawsuit, finding
that the plaintiffs could not "establish a personal injury sufficient to confer
standing by merely alleging some genealogical relationship to African-
(discussing the Alexander case).
180 See Verdun, supra note 54, at 600 (writing that "the post Civil Liberties Act era beginning in
1989" was one of "five major waves of political activism that promoted reparations"); see also supra
notes 8-21 (discussing very early reparations attempts and how reparations lawsuits and other proposals
have existed in some form or another since before the Civil War).
181 See Wenger, supra note 109, at 302. After examining the effects of each type of attenuation, I
ultimately concluded that "it is not an overstatement to say that no case that suffered from all three
kinds of attenuation has successfully proceeded to a successful resolution through trial or settlement.
This is a dire diagnosis for reparations." Id. at 305.
182 Brophy notes that "courts typically deal with claims by well-identified victims against well-
identified wrongdoers. Reparations lawsuits are often a different type, setting a class of victims against
a class of descendants of perpetrators, current beneficiaries of past injustice, and others. The lawsuits
frequently pose a claim of a group, loosely identified by relation to those enslaved, against the entire
society. Such claims are hard to put into a legal framework." BROPHY, supra note 1, at 99; see also
Matsuda, supra note 48, at 374-85.
183 Brophy notes, "One wonders whether the lawsuit might be more viable if the class were people
descended from the people who worked for (or were bought and sold or whose life was insured by) the
defendant companies" in question. BROPHY, supra note 1, at 123. See also id at 108 (arguing that the
consolidated case was brought prematurely, because there was not sufficient research to link plaintiffs
and defendants); Wenger, supra note 109, at 316-21 (discussing the possible future use of statistical
evidence in reparations litigation, but noting that this evidence does not yet exist)..
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Americans held in slavery over 100, 200, or 300 years ago."' 84 The
appellate court agreed, opining that "this causal chain is too long and has
too many weak links for a court to be able to find that the defendants'
conduct harmed the plaintiffs at all, let alone in an amount that could be
estimated without the wildest speculation."' 85
The statute of limitations was also a fatal barrier.186 There may have
been potential ways around the statute of limitations; as Brophy noted,
courts could toll the statute, or legislators could pass legislation allowing a
suit to go forward.18 7 Absent some affirmative step, however, statutes of
limitation blocked the claim. The court found these barriers fatal to the
case, holding that:
Given that the institution of chattel slavery in the United States ended
in 1865, Plaintiffs' century-old claims would have accrued by 1865 at
the latest. The longest limitations period for any of Plaintiffs' century-
old claims is five years, which would have run well over a century
prior to the filing of the instant Complaint. If cognizable claims ever
existed, those claims were owned by former slaves themselves, and
became time-barred when the statutes of limitations expired in the
nineteenth century. As such, Plaintiffs' century-old claims are barred
by the statutes of limitations in every jurisdiction.188
Other legal hurdles also affected the recent lawsuits. The most
significant of these was sovereign immunity, which not only led to the
dismissal of the Cato case, but also led plaintiffs to bring relatively weaker
lawsuits against corporations.189
The underlying problem was the limited scope of the judicial system in
general. As Brophy notes, "U.S. courts are designed to handle only limited
claims. These are claims by plaintiffs against other defendants for very
well-identified harmsFalse Plaintiffs must identify some legal right that
has been violated by the defendant, and the ways that violation has led
directly to harm to the plaintiff."190 The rules tend to privilege claimants
who fit well into existing social structure, not those "at the bottom" of the
184 In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 471 F.3d 754, 752 (7th Cir. 2006).
185 Id. at 759.
186 Brophy notes that "there would be serious problems" with statutes of limitation. BROPHY,
supra note 1, at 126.
187 See id. at 126-27.
188 In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 375 F.Supp.2d 721, 773 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
189 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 121-23 (discussing sovereign immunity); see also Wenger, supra
note 93, at 248-49 (suggesting one way to avoid this barrier).
190 BROPHY, supra note 1, at 98.
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social ladder.191 Novel legal ideas do not fit well into this formula.192
Given the limits of the judicial system and the underlying legal doctrines, it
is not surprising that reparations lawsuits failed. They did not fit into the
existing framework. 193 As I noted in another context, reparations claims
simply weren't "torty."l 94
IV. REPARATIONS DISCOURSE FOLLOWING LAWSUIT FAILURE
A. The Collapse of the Post-Millennial Legal Reparations Narrative
As noted earlier, a specific legal narrative arose in the past decade, built
on the idea of lawsuits as a tool to help drive settlement. Thus, lawsuit
failure has several effects. Lawsuits failed to provide direct reparation, nor
were advocates able to use them to obtain discovery, or other piggyback
effects, such as in the tobacco litigation. Furthermore, reparation lawsuits
failed to create the desired secondary effect of a litigation-impelled
settlement, whether through congressional action or private company
embarrassment. Finally, the existence of the reparations lawsuits did not
lead to a shift in public opinion about large scale reparations. In short, not
only were the lawsuits themselves ineffective, the legal narrative itself
failed.
A major problem was the mismatch between the lawsuits and the
strategic needs of the movement. Because the earlier lawsuits against
governments had been dismissed, the Slave Descendants plaintiffs targeted
private companies whose corporate forebears were involved in different
aspects of the slave trade.195  The focus on those defendants was
problematic because of their relatively low moral culpability. But none of
the more culpable actors - the individual slave holders who committed the
torts, or the state and federal governments that created and enforced the
regime - were available as defendants. Individual slave owners had died,
taking their legal culpability to the grave with them, and governments were
191 See generally Matsuda, supra note 48 (lamenting that rules tend to privilege claimants who fit
into well existing social structure).
192 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 108; Wenger, supra note 143, at 196-205.
193 See Wenger, supra note 147, at 196-212. Ironically enough, the best reparations claims, from a
legal perspective, were the very early claims, which had a strong causal connection. However, such
claims had no chance of success, due to widespread societal racism. See supra notes 8-21 and
accompanying text.
194 Wenger, supra note 147, at 205.
195 See id. at 248, 256-58 (examining the Cato case); BROPHY, supra note 1, at 123 (describing the
Slave Descendants lawsuit).
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shielded by sovereign immunity. 196 Meanwhile, corporate actors had
inherited their predecessors' debts as a matter of successor company
law. 197  But they did not inherit clear moral culpability for their
predecessors' wrongs; thus, the moral claims against them were less
compelling.198 As Roy Brooks phrased it, the tort approach suffered from
"moral deficiency."l 99
The lesser moral culpability of defendants would have been largely moot
if legal claims had succeeded. But legal culpability was also unclear
because of the attenuated causal links between plaintiffs and defendants. 200
Thus, the lawsuits inhabited a problematic no-man's-land. They were
bound by legal requirements that limited them to defendants of lesser moral
culpability, yet claims were not legally strong enough to succeed in court.
It was the worst of both worlds.
In part because of their reliance on less clear moral claims, the lawsuits
were unable to follow the lead of prior precedents and shift public opinion
as the legal narrative had contemplated. 201 For instance, the litigation
regarding Japanese-Americans served an important educational purpose
and helped to shape public opinion.202 But reparations lawsuits had a
tougher path. They relied on retelling an older story and more conceptually
challenging story. The same causal attenuation which had undercut the
lawsuits in court also undercut public acceptance of the reparations
narrative. Slavery and race riot claims were morally compelling and
offered clean-cut lines of wrongdoing in the abstract, but advocates could
not convince the public that corporate successors of antebellum railroad
companies should foot the bill.
The post-millennial racial climate is a mixed bag for reparations
advocates. On one hand, there is widespread public acceptance of basic
196 See Wenger, supra note 109, at 296-301 (explaining that governments are shielded by
sovereign immunity).
197 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 123 (describing the corporate defendants); see also Wenger,
supra note 109, at 322-23 (noting that corporate defendants do not comprise the majority of the slavery
market).
198 This point is made by reparations critic Olson. See Olson, supra note 94, at 2-3. This point is
also brought up in a discussion of wrongdoer attenuation. See Wenger, supra note 109, at 296-301.
199 See BROOKS, supra note 16, at 140.
200 As noted above, some of these problems were caused by the lawsuit being brought too soon.
"Deadria Farmer-Paellman framed the lawsuit in a way that created problems .... A more credible suit
would have located the descendants of slaves who worked for CSX's predecessors or whose lives were
insured by Aetna." BROPHY, supra note 1, at 124-25. See supra text Part II1.D (discussing the Slave
Descendants court's analysis).
201 See supra text Part III.B. (discussing the legal narrative and the role of lawsuits in changing
public opinion).
202 See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text (explaining the role of lawsuits in shaping
public opinion about Japanese-Americans).
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liberal antiracist ideals. The moral force of slavery claims in the abstract is
undisputed, with near-universal condemnation of overtly racist past acts. 203
Even reparations opponents almost invariably agree that slavery was a
terrible initial harm. 204
On the other hand, many Americans believe that the book is closed -
they have long-formed opinions about Blacks, and are uninterested in
hearing more about slavery.205 As Roy Brooks notes, "[w]hites have an
emotional interest in denying the fact that an American institution as
horrific as slavery could have lingering effects in twenty-first century
America." 206 This reflects in part the problem of interest convergence, that
"[t]he interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated
only when it converges with the interest of whites." 207
Modem racism is often unconscious rather than overt.208 Without the
easy external racist markers of earlier eras, it is easy for Americans to
ignore the issue.209 Problems such as disparate resource allocation can be
203 See, e.g., Magee, supra note 9, at 879 (citing an objecting statement of Rep. Sessenbrenner,
which begins, "there's no more detestable institution than slavery, but . . ."); see also id. at 915 (noting
that overt racism is "deplored as anathema").
204 For instance, the Slave Descendants opinion clearly condemned slavery and recognized that
slaves had been greatly harned. See In Re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304
F.Supp.2d at 1034-38 (N.D. Ill. 2004). The Court concluded that, "It is beyond debate that slavery has
caused tremendous suffering and ineliminable scars throughout our Nation's history. However,
Plaintiffs' claims, as alleged in their Complaint, fail based on numerous well-settled legal principles."
Id. at 1075.
There are a few exceptions to this general rule. See, e.g, DAVID HOROWITZ, UNCIVIL WARS 70-83
(2003) (arguing that slavery benefited Blacks).
205 Ariela Gross, When Is the Time of Slavery? The History of Slavery in Contemporary Legal and
Political Argument, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 283, 284-87 (2008) (discussing different views about the history
of slavery in America); Wenger, supra note 147, at 222-25 (discussing how this disparity undercuts
support for reparations); see generally BROPHY, supra note 1, at 4-5 (discussing public attitudes
towards reparations); Taunya Lovell Banks, Exploring White Resistance to Racial Reconciliation in the
United States, 55 RUTGERS L. REv. 903, 912-18, 945 (2003).
206 BROOKS, supra note 16, at 150. As one reporter describes the problem, "opponents say there
is no precedent for paying people who are dead, that reparations are usually awarded to survivors."
Kevin Merida, "Did Freedom Alone Pay a Nation's Debt? Rep. John Conyers Jr. Has a Question. He's
Willing to Wait a Long Time for the Answer, " WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1999, at C-1. Another critic
argues that "it is obscene to think of this modem generation of black Americans profiting from the
blood money drawn nearly 140 years ago from the exploitation of slaves." Juan Williams, Slavery Isn't
the Issue, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2002.
207 Bell, supra note 142, at 523 (suggesting the interest of Blacks in achieving racial equality will
be accommodated only when it converges with whites' interest); cf Richard Delgado, The Imperial
Scholar, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 567 (1984) (stating that "[whites] may pull their punches with respect
to remedies, especially where remedying [Blacks'] situation entails uncomfortable consequences for
[whites]").
Because of interest convergence, Blacks are most likely to be politically successful when they can
convince whites that their political interests are aligned. See generally Wenger, supra note 147, at 219
(discussing interest convergence in the reparations context).
208 See generally Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
209 See Brooks, supra note 84, at 10-13, 37-62 (discussing ongoing struggles in the Black
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invisible.210 Not surprisingly, polls show that only 5% of whites support
reparations.211 And in fact, there is an active anti-reparations movement
among white Americans. 212 Reparations will only become feasible when a
large number of white Americans believe that it is in their best interest.213
Rejection by conservatives is probably to be expected, since the concept of
reparations is deeply embedded in the "culture wars" of political hot-button
issues.214 More alarming is the idea that reparation has failed to catch on
among many moderates and progressives.
The legal narrative sought to bridge this gap, but failed. Advocates used
lawsuits to draw attention to continuing harm suffered by Blacks.215
However, the discussion did not convince the courts. As previously noted,
the lawsuits failed to show the necessary legal links between past harms
and modern claims. The lawsuits were also ineffective at altering existing
skepticism and raising consciousness about links between slavery and its
current effects in the Black community. Although the Tulsa race riot has
raised some level of consciousness, it has not raised enough to galvanize
support for reparations. Even worse, the court's own skeptical analysis
entered the discussion, and helped to reinforce the original anti-reparations
criticism and skepticism. Advocates had inadvertently helped a new
skeptical voice enter the narrative, thereby undercutting the broader public
discussion.216
community).
210 See id at 125-82 (providing extensive charts illustrating demographic gaps between racial
groups in wealth, education, crime, and many other areas). As Brooks demonstrates, "race still matters
in post-civil rights America." Id. at 113.
211 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 4-5; see also Alfred Brophy, The Cultural War over Reparations
for Slavery, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1181, 1182-85 (2004); Banks, supra note 206, at 915-19; Michael
Kranish, Blacks Rally on Capital for Slavery Reparations: Farrakhan Seeks Transfer of Land, BOSTON
GLOBE, Aug. 18, 2002, at A3. As Brophy notes, "Lest one think that Alabama is out of step with
attitudes elsewhere in the United States, that racial gap is fairly constant. According to a study by
Harvard University and University of Chicago researchers reported in the spring of 2003, only 4% of
whites support reparations payments." BROPHY, supra note 1, at 4-5. See Lee A. Harris, "Reparations"
as a Dirty Word: The Norm Against Slavery Reparations, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 409,410 n.9.
212 See HENRY, supra note 1, at 93-122 (discussing the development of the anti-reparations
movement).
213 See Magee, supra note 9, at 910. "As long as whites continue to predominate in positions of
power over Blacks within the system, they bring the subconscious belief in white supremacy to bear on
the process.... [Tihe court system and Congress can no more operate outside the American culture and
its prevailing social relations than an individual can step outside of her own skin." Id. at 910-11. In
addition, American beliefs about individualism mean that whites generally do not see themselves as a
privileged racialized group. See Banks, supra note 206.
214 See Brophy, supra note 211 (noting that the nature of reparations are controversial); see also
BROPHY, supra note 1, at 86-92 (analyzing the debate over reparations).
215 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 129 (discussing continuing violation arguments).
216 That is, people may believe that if there is not a legal remedy, there was no real injury. See
Marc Galanter, The Dialectic of Injury and Remedy, 44 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 1 (2010) (discussing how
injury and remedy can be mutually constitutive); Wenger, supra note 147, at 194, 206-07 (same); cf
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Instead of reinforcing the links between race and oppression, reparations
lawsuits inadvertently de-emphasized the Blackness of the victims. In the
lawsuit context, the race of claimants became largely irrelevant; the lawsuit
would look more or less the same if similar actions had happened to any
other group. In effect, reparations lawsuits adopted a standard of
colorblindness. This allowed them to draw from legal precedents that did
not involve Blacks, but rather groups such as Holocaust victims, Japanese
Americans, and even tobacco smokers. 217  This may have been a
reasonable compromise given the law's historic hostility to claims brought
by Blacks, but the colorblind claim also failed. 218 In addition, the
colorblind approach undermined the victims' moral claims. A colorblind
approach can address only overt racism, but does nothing to address the
underlying racial hierarchy. 219 The racialized harm of slavery can only be
addressed by explicitly recognizing (and undermining) the links between
race and oppression. 220
B. Re-evaluating Reparations Narratives
Lawsuit failure forced advocates to discard a model which, while
intriguing, was flawed in significant ways. This provided an opportunity to
reassess both the perceived benefits and drawbacks of the legal reparations
narrative, and to ask how various rhetorical approaches to reparations can
advance the movement's goals more broadly. 221
The rise and fall of the legal reparations narrative illustrates some of the
limits of practical reparations approaches. The lawsuits carefully framed
limited claims in legal terms, in order to use the tort model. Despite such
compromises, courts were still unwilling to accept the idea of reparations.
It may be impossible to shoehorn the racial justice questions of reparations
into the narrow legal box of tort doctrine. Matsuda suggested that
David M. Engel & Michael McCann, Tort Law as Cultural Practice, in Fault Lines: Tort Law as
Cultural Practice 1-3 (2009) (discussing how tort law reflects cultural views).
217 See, e.g., Wenger, supra note 109, at 285, 304-05 (noting litigation precedents); BROPHY, supra
note 1, at 45-46 (analyzing international examples of reparations).
218 Cf Matsuda, supra note 48, at 374-76 (discussing the law's hostility to claims from powerless
classes).
219 See supra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing critical race theory critique of the
colorblind approach).
220 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 60, at 214-19, 227-30 (noting that blacks are more likely to be
incarcerated and hold lower level jobs); see also supra notes 32-38 (discussing James Forman's
critique).
221 See Eric Yamamoto et al., American Reparations Theory and Practice at the Crossroads, 44
CAL. W. L. REv. 1 (2007) (discussing how deep wounds of social injustice sometimes persist over
generations); cf BROPHY, supra note 1, at 168 (stating goals of reparations).
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reparations were not attainable in existing legal framework. 222 Reparations
lawsuits challenged that idea - but Matsuda was right, tort law simply does
not fit.223 Tort law's focus on individual injury cannot account for group
harms, or reflect the ways in which people interact in an interconnected
web.224
The court decisions illustrate the boundaries of the legal system. Courts
are not designed to address tort damages without individual causation.
Reparations advocates cannot further narrow their claims; and even if they
could, it is not clear that any kind of reparations claim can prevail in court.
Tort lawsuits represented reparations at some of their most practical points,
yet they were still insufficiently practical for the mainstream legal system.
In addition, the tort framework sapped some of the moral force out of
reparations claims. The most compelling feature of reparations claims is
not that they are particularly well-situated as legal claims. Tort law
separates real harm from legally cognizable harm, and allows some types
of harm to be ignored by law.225 By entering the legal arena, reparationists
were bound by ill-fitting legal formalities, which were not designed to help
oppressed parties, but rather to maintain the position of the powerful. 226
That system and its legal fictions allowed the Slave Descendants court to
conclude, paradoxically, "slavery was terrible . .. sorry, no recovery." 227
The failure of reparations lawsuits should not lead advocates to abandon
the practical reparations strand entirely. Rather, lawsuit failure calls for a
recalibration of sorts. As suggested earlier, both strands of reparations
222 See Matsuda, supra note 48, at 397-98 (noting problems with attaining reparations outside of a
critical framework); Wenger, supra note 147, at 196-205 (discussing how reparations claims do not fit
well into law).
223 See id. (describing the difficulty within the current legal system of granting reparations based
on group harms); see also Wenger, supra note 109, at 284, 292 (noting the difficulty of reparations
claims in the tort context). Wenger, supra note 147, at 196-215 (same).
224 See Dayna Nadine Scott, Body Polluted: Questions of Scale, Gender, and Remedy, 44 Loyola
L.A. L. Rev. 121, 139-47.
225 See Wenger, supra note 109, at 281 (stating that the attenuated nature of harm in reparations
cases makes showing both but-for cause and proximate cause, as required by tort law, very difficult);
see also Mari Matsuda, On Causation, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 2195, 2200-16 (2000) (explaining old and
new understandings about causation and stating that some injuries are far too remote for the law to
allow a remedy).
226 See Matsuda, supra note 48, at 379 ("Members of the dominant class continue to benefit from
the wrongs of the past and the presumptions of inferiority imposed upon victims."); see also Peggy
Davis, Law as Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 1559, 1570 (1989) (noting how Blacks receive messages
of subordination and inferiority when their views are disregarded, eroding their confidence in the legal
system); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 417 (1987) ("The legal system did not provide blacks with structured
expectations, promises, or reasonable reliances of any sort.").
227 In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 304 F.Supp.2d 1027 (N.D. Ill. 2004)
(holding that although slavery was terrible, plaintiffs were unable to recover); see Magee, supra note 9,
at 914 ("[D]espite clear evidence of injury . .. legal institutions fail to take responsibility[.]").
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dialogue can play important roles.228 The legal framing had many effects
on the discussion, and some of these may be worth keeping.
Lawsuits provided cohesion for the movement - but this was a mixed
blessing. There are distinct advantages to the kind of focused and in-depth
discussion that cohesion fostered. Reparations lawsuits also promised a
clear endpoint. Conversely, it is also possible that the legal discussion
streamlined conversations in a negative way as well, by directing energy
into conceptual cul-de-sacs. Legal emphasis may have sapped broader
dialogue focused on more creative remedies. Finally, legal framing may
have privileged particular adversarial conversations, thus contributing to
the highly polarized nature of the reparations discourse.
Without the possibility of legal recovery, there is no reason to retain the
quirky rules and conceptual cul-de-sacs that the lawsuit model imposes.
These include lawsuits' artificial sole focus on corporations, as well as
legal doctrines such as unjust enrichment which lack moral force. If the
master's tools cannot be used to dismantle the master's house,229 there is
little use in keeping them around. Advocates should also reject the implied
colorblind aspects of the lawsuit approach, and instead, re-race reparations.
Reparations lawsuits inadvertently sidelined the racial nature of
reparations, but without legal success, consequently de-racing reparations
for the proverbial mess of pottage. 230 Slavery creates a powerful moral
claim precisely because of its racial nature.
On balance, it may be a good thing that the litigation failed. The demise
of the lawsuit approach offers a chance to reevaluate, and potentially open
new paths going forward. 231
V. REPARATIONS, RHETORIC, AND REVOLUTION: REBUILDING
REPARATIONS NARRATIVES
It is now certain that reparations will not follow the lawsuit to settlement
path of other groups, such as Holocaust survivors and Japanese-Americans.
228 Cf Matsuda, supra note 47, at 398 (noting the use of both critical and liberal arguments).
229 See Magee, supra note 9, at *CITE (discussing the master's tools metaphor); Audre Lorde, The
Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider (1984).
230 The Biblical Esau sold his valuable birthright to his brother for a meal. The phrase "a mess of
pottage" has since meant the giving up of something valuable for an illusory benefit. See Genesis
25:29-34 (King James). "[A]nd Esau came from the field, and he [was] faint: And Esau said to Jacob,
Feed me, I pray thee, with that same red [pottage]; for I [am] faint . . .. And Jacob said, Sell me this day
thy birthright .. . and he sold his birthright unto Jacob. Then Jacob gave Esau bread and pottage of
lentils; and he did eat and drink, and rose up, and went his way[.]" Id.
231 Cf Matsuda, supra note 48, at 352-53 (pointing out that there are benefits to a united front, but
also benefits to having many different approaches); Aiyetoro, supra note 40, at 140 (suggesting that the
Cato loss was a boon for reparations advocates, because it provided a roadmap for future strategy).
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Reparations advocates will need to break new ground in order to succeed.
Notably, this is hardly unusual, for each of the mass restitution groups that
received reparations broke new ground in one way or another. Admittedly,
only a few such groups had barriers quite as high as reparationists now
face, but all restitution claims have been difficult. Legal failure itself is a
minor setback. In fact, lawsuits failed for other groups, such as Japanese-
Americans, who ultimately did receive restitution. 232 The continuing gap in
political progress is a bigger concern. The role of new reparations
narratives will be to bridge that gap, and thereby alter public perception by
making the moral case for reparations through these narratives. Indeed,
reparations claims are strongest in the moral arena, not in the courtroom.
A. Renewing Radical Reparations
With the decline of the legal narrative comes a natural movement
towards renewed radical reparations. Lawsuit failure strengthens and fuels
radical arguments, which focus on inequities in existing power structures.
The Slave Descendants decision was a setback for practical reparations, but
a gain for radical reparations, as it further eroded Black trust in the legal
system.233
Radical resurgence is a necessary corrective. Reparations' roots lie in
revolution and radical challenge to racism. Reviving radical reparations
means that reparationists should "think big" and bring back the grandeur of
radical reparations. 234 Now that the artificial constraints of lawsuits are
gone, reparationists should think creatively about ways to combat white
privilege. 235 Early civil rights cases involved sweeping equitable remedies
and structural injunctions. Reparations could implement similar tactics,
such as reenergizing affirmative action, or partnering with advocates in
others areas of law to fight racial subordination.
232 See Magee, supra note 9, at 904 (noting that the Supreme Court declined to grant reparations
for Japanese-American survivors of World War II internment camps in United States v. Hohri).
233 See Roy L. Brooks, Rehabilitative Reparations for the Judicial Process, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 475 (2003) (discussing Black distrust of the judicial system); see also Wenger, supra note 81, at
240-41 (stating that the breached Rule of Law caused by slavery resulted in resentment and distrust of
law within the black community).
234 See Brooks, supra note 70, at 740 (suggesting that reparationists should think big).
235 See Manning Marable, Along the Color Line: In Defense of Black Reparations, Nov. 11, 2002,
http://www.zcommunications.org/contents/29065 (suggesting that reparations are part of a movement
for ending white privilege); cf BROPHY, supra note 1, at 71-72 (discussing Marable's argument and
questioning the value of white privilege for whites living in poverty or who have no college education).
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B. Radically Practical or Practically Radical? Weaving the Strands
Together
It will take the right balance to overcome the serious public hostility
towards reparations. Both practical and radical sides are important.
Radical reparations arguments illustrate racial subordination and energize
the movement. However, firebrands like Forman or Garvey were unable to
achieve lasting political success, and similar radical proposals may not be
politically palatable. If public opinion on reparations is to change, it will
be through dialogues that fit relatively well into existing social structures.
Excessive practicality is problematic, however, because too narrow of a
focus on practical arguments can strip reparations claims of their moral
force. Reparations claims must remain connected to the racial roots of
slavery and focus on fundamental issues of justice, not legal technicalities.
Roy Brooks suggests an approach of "practical idealism." "The 'idealism'
in practical idealism helps to shape morally responsive reparations. The
'practical' in practical idealism narrowly tailors the reparation to the nature
and scope of the antecedent atrocity." 236 With the goal of balancing the
strengths of both radical and practical approaches to reparations, I will set
out a few ideas for moving forward while drawing on the strengths of each
facet.
a. Storytelling
As I have written elsewhere, 237 one promising approach is storytelling.
Most Americans believe, albeit incorrectly, that they have a good
understanding of the history of slavery, and of race issues in general.238
This faulty belief can be challenged by storytelling that contradicts the
popular consciousness. 239
Such storytelling worked very effectively for Japanese-Americans, as
eye-opening accounts of veterans and wrongful convictions caught the
public's attention. 240 Slave reparations must use this tactic of attacking
236 Brooks, supra note 70, at 741.
237 Wenger, supra note 147.
238 Wenger, supra note 147, at 222-23.
239 Richard Delgado notes that "[s]tories, parables, chronicles, and narratives are powerful ways
for destroying mindset -- the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdoms, and shared understandings
against a backdrop of which legal and political discourse takes place." Richard Delgado, Storytelling
for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2413 (1989).
240 Wenger, supra note 143, at 222.
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myths, including the beliefs that slavery was limited to the South, that it
cleanly ended in 1865, and that it was a minor part of United States history.
The abysmally low numbers, such as the 5% polls, reflect, in part, a low
public understanding of the breadth and effects of slavery. As Brooks
notes, "when whites reject reparations on the grounds that they had nothing
to do with slavery, they fail to understand the centrality of slavery in the
socioeconomic development of this great country." 241
Storytelling can educate the public about the widespread use of slavery
outside of Southern plantations. Slavery was an economic foundation for
the whole country, "not some Southern anomaly. We all inherit
responsibility."242 Storytelling illuminates the North's ties to slavery, as
well as the common use of slaves in industrial work, such as building and
maintaining railroads. 243 Storytelling combats the perception that slavery's
impact was limited and regional, and that only a small number of Southern
whites benefited from slavery.244 It affirms the abolitionist refrain that
slavery was built upon an "unholy alliance ... between the lords of the lash
and lords of the loom" - that is, slave owners and Northern textile
manufacturers. 245 In addition, storytelling raises consciousness about
horrific and little-known massacres like Tulsa.
Truth commissions can "lay the groundwork for a national consensus on
reparations and also serve a cathartic purpose, which would offer emotional
closure for victims." 246 The state commission in Tulsa led to official
storytelling and unprecedented acceptance of blame. 247 Thus, despite the
241 BROOKS, supra note 16, at 148.
242 Advocates Quietly Push for Slavery Repayment, USA TODAY, July 9, 2006 (quoting white
filmmaker Katrina Browne); see Traces of the Trade - Synopsis, http://www.tracesofthetrade.org
/synopsis ("Over the generations, the family transported more than ten thousand enslaved Africans
across the Middle Passage. They amassed an enormous fortune. By the end of his life, James DeWolf
had been a U.S. Senator and was the second richest man in the United States.... While the DeWolfs
were one of only a few 'slaving' dynasties, the network of commercial activities that they were tied to
involved an enormous portion of the Northern population. Many citizens, for example, would buy
shares in slave ships in order to make a profit.").
243 See Theodore Komweibel, Jr., Proceedings of the Scholarly Conference Taking Reparations
Seriously: Reparations and Railroads, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 219, 221-26 (2007) (explaining that
plantation slaves were often rented out for railroad or other industrial labor, and that in comparison to
plantation work, "by every criterion, railroad slavery was worse").
244 See, e.g., DAVID HOROWITZ, UNCIVIL WARS 81 (2003) (arguing that not all whites benefitted
from slavery by asking, "[d]id a dirt-poor squatter in the Dakota territory circa 1860 really get some
kind of psychological boost from the fact that Blacks were enslaved two thousand miles away?").
245 See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR 140
(1960).
246 Brophy, supra note 118, at 537; see BROPHY, supra note 1, at 170 (examining truth
commissions).
247 See Miller, supra note 103, at 60-65 (discussing Tulsa).
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lawsuit dismissal, Tulsa is a kind of reparations success story, 248 laying a
foundation for future actions. As Roy Brooks suggests in Atonement and
Forgiveness, storytelling "provides the factual foundation for apology." 249
Storytelling blends both radical and practical elements. It is radical in
that it challenges prevailing ideas about race in a way that gives voice to
minority groups who have been excluded from the traditional legal
framework and discussion. 250 It is practical in that it fits in existing legal
structures. This is especially important because, unlike some racial
remedies, storytelling is not limited by current constitutional
jurisprudence. 251
b. Microreparations
Also of note is the growing movement for microreparations. Different
varieties of localized reparations programs have become increasingly
popular. 252 Brophy has charted the striking increase in these reparations
programs over the past ten years. 253 The public distrust of broad-scale
reparations has not harmed the popularity of microreparations, which today
signify a rare bright spot for reparationists. Microreparations blend the two
strands of reparations; they are practical in their fit into existing law, while
they also have radical effects.
Microreparations success also illustrates the consciousness-raising of the
lawsuits. And microreparations ordinances may provide opportunities for
additional storytelling or spotlighting. For instance, recent slavery
ordinances may provide a platform for storytelling in the context of the
law. These ordinances call for businesses to disclose their past ties to
slavery. 254 Reparations advocates can use these ordinances as a platform
by bringing litigation or other actions to enforce them. They can call
public attention to reparations without seeming self-serving, and can
highlight the many lesser-known links to slavery.
248 See Wenger, supra note 147, at 225 (suggesting that taken as a whole, Tulsa "is a reparations
success story").
249 BROOKS, supra note 16, at 148.
250 See Delgado, supra note 240, at 2413; see also Richard Delgado, When a Story is Just a Story:
Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 VA. L. REv. 95 (1990).
251 Cf BROPHY, supra note 1, at 158-64 (discussing constitutionality of reparations); Wenger,
supra note 147, at 226 (noting that there is no constitutional limit on storytelling).
252 See Kaimipono David Wenger, Towards Microreparations (draft, on file with author); Wenger,
supra note 147, at 227 (discussing microreparations).
253 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 30-32. Surprisingly, Brophy gives this topic relatively little
further analysis.
254 See id. at 50-52 (citing various universities, the state of California, and the city of Chicago as
examples where past ties to slavery have been disclosed).
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Other sorts of rights may provide the context for storytelling and public
consciousness-raising about slavery. For instance, Brophy has recently
written about the right to access graveyards. 255 This is an evocative image
which may serve as a platform for storytelling and consciousness-raising.
Many opportunities for microreparations remain. The St. Louis riot story
is, in some ways, as compelling as Tulsa, and may be the next
microreparations front.256
Microreparations can build on and interact with intermediate steps, such
as apology, affirmative action, and commemorative events. 257 Society
already engages in periodic discussion of racial ideas, such as during Black
History Month and on Martin Luther King Day. Microreparations efforts
can build on existing building blocks.
c. Moral and Restorative Framing
In addition, reparations advocates can draw on moral and restorative
frameworks. One important idea here is the concept of restorative justice,
which is drawn from human rights law. Restorative justice is "focused on
attempting to make the victim and society whole."258 It "tends to be
community-oriented, aimed at restoring society through reconciliation,"
and "may take the form of truth commissions and symbolic gestures of
atonement and forgiveness between victim and perpetrator." 259
255 See id. at 133 (discussing the potential for symbolic relief for slaves' defendants from being
able to gain access to plantations where their ancestors are buried); see also Alfred Brophy, Grave
Matters: The Ancient Rights of the Graveyard, 2006 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1469 (noting the conflict between
the right to worship at the graves of ancestors and the right to exclude people from private property).
256 See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 134 (detailing the riots in St. Louis).
257 Cf Kaimipono David Wenger, Apology Lite: Truths, Doubts, and Reconciliations in the
Senate's Guarded Apology for Slavery, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing the Senate's apology
concerning slavery, and whether a stand-alone apology can ever be a valid form of reparation).
258 Linda M. Keller, Seeking Justice at the International Criminal Court: Victims' Reparations, 29
T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 189, 191-92 (2007) (describing restorative justice and how it can influence both
the victim and society as a whole); see BROOKS, supra note 16, at 141 (noting that racial reconciliation
will rely on restorative justice ideas).
259 Keller, supra note 258, at 190 (contrasting restorative and retributive justice); see Magee, supra
note 9, at 913 (arguing that reparations would have a powerful symbolic value, and that they would be
"an extreme expression of official responsibility," but that because of that, they are particularly
susceptible to majority attack); see also Keller, supra note 258, at 211 n.107, 217 (discussing methods
of disbursing of awards). See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What is it and how
does it Work?, 10 AM. REV. L. Soc. SCI. 1 (2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfn
?abstract id=1005485 (reviewing the literature on the varied arenas in which restorative justice is
theorized and practiced); Michael F. Blevins, Restorative Justice, Slavery, and the American Soul: A
Policy-Oriented Intercultural Human Rights Approach to the Question of Reparations, 31 T. Marshall
L. Rev. 253, 290-93 (2006).
Another promising option is Ho'oponopono, the traditional Hawaiian concept of reconciliation among
members of a family or community. See Wenger, supra note 147, at 229-30 (discussing ho'oponopono
in the reparations context); see also Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercultural Justice and the
Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1666-67 (2000) (discussing the concept of
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Another option is the moral approach of atonement suggested by Roy
Brooks.260 The idea of atonement originates in the religious context, and
signifies a reconciliation or setting straight of records. 261 It also implies an
expiatory act, which is designed to heal harms done in the past. As in the
religious context, reparations for slavery would involve a sacrifice designed
to show contrition, and to cleanse and make the community whole. 262 The
atonement approach is one of treating all individuals as community
members who have been harmed by the racism that is an ongoing legacy of
slavery.263 Atonement requires not simply monetary payments, but also the
moral gesture of apology. 264 Brooks writes that "atonement - apology and
reparations - plus forgiveness leads to racial reconciliation." 265 The idea of
atonement can fit into existing law, but it involves a radical re-envisioning
of the moral framework of reparations.
Ideas like storytelling, microreparations, restorative justice, and
atonement draw on both the practical and radical sides of reparations
discourse. They blend well with the results-oriented focus of practical
reparations, but as consciousness-raising tools they can be quite radical in
their ultimate effects.
CONCLUSION
The intellectual history of reparations argument shows the ways that
advocates have framed the idea over time. The discourse reflects shifts in
the goals of the reparations movement, as well as changing perceptions of
political realities. The interplay between radical and practical strands of
reparations offers not only a fascinating history, but also a possible map for
the future. Moving forward will ultimately require strategies that can build
on both practical and radical approaches to reparations.
Ho'oponopono within the context of the illegality of the taking of Hawaii).
260 See BROOKS, supra note 16, at 143-47, 165-69. Brooks pointedly disavows the debt analogy
espoused by advocates like Randall Robinson. See id. at 14, 138-43. Brooks' approach is one of moral
reflection, rather than one opposed to political confrontation. See BROPHY, supra note 1, at 73.
261 See BROOKS, supra note 16, at 141 (discussing atonement).
262 Atonement is a religious term, typically used in Christian theology to represent the religious act
of Jesus cleansing the sins of the world; more broadly, atonement is a form of moral cleansing and
reconciliation. See BROOKS, supra note 16; Wenger, supra note 147, at 228n.300 (discussing the
history of the concept of atonement).
263 See Wenger, supra note 81, at 241-44 (explaining how emancipation, while beneficial to those
freed, does not constitute takings compensation because emancipation itself provided no monetary
relief).
264 See BROOKS, supra note 16, at 141 (discussing atonement); see also Jason Solomon, What is
Civil Justice?, 44 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 333-36 (2010) (discussing the moral force of apology).
265 BROOKS, supra note 16, at 143, 148 (discussing reparations as a chance to clarify the historical
record).
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